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Abstract
Electric power networks are complex systems because of their geographic spread and the
consequent need for interconnections and integration of different components such as gen-
erators, transformers, lines, reactors, relays, and loads. Therefore, power utilities seek to
ensure an acceptable degree of reliability in planning and operations, and accordingly, need
information on component outages while satisfying the growing demand in order to ensure
the availability of the system and prevent downtimes. Power systems of today are facing
major challenges because of the rapid increase in penetration of energy resources (ERs)
and plug-in electric vehicles (PEV).
This thesis focuses on the evaluation of composite system reliability using direct prob-
abilistic analysis techniques. The research presents the mathematical foundations, evalu-
ation procedures, and reliability and risk indices associated with composite power system
reliability evaluation using the minimal cut set calculations. The concept of minimal cut
sets is applied to evaluate two sets of reliability and risk indices, system indices and nodal
indices. System indices are essential for system planners and operators to determine the
likelihood of interruption of supply, while nodal indices provide useful information on sig-
nificant load points. The performance of the system under outage condition of generators,
transmission lines, or both, is examined by conducting an appropriate power flow study.
An optimal power flow (OPF) model is solved to find the system and nodal minimal cut
sets and the associated indices.
The thesis presents a novel composite system reliability based planning for ERs with
clustering techniques based approaches to determine the optimal location, size and year of
installation of ERs in the system. The K-means clustering and Fuzzy C-means clustering
techniques are applied to the set of reliability indices, Load Not Served per Interruption
(LNSI), which are determined using nodal minimal cut sets. The nodal minimal cut sets
are obtained using an OPF based approach. Once the optimal sizes and locations of ERs
iv
are obtained, the earliest year of their penetration into the system is determined using an
adequacy check algorithm.
The thesis further presents a novel method to detect the critical components of com-
posite power systems under steady-state conditions and short-term operations in order to
help planners make economic decisions on new investments in generation capacities and
transmission lines upgrades, and also to help operators maintain the delivery of electricity
during system failure and disturbance events. Each component is ranked based on mini-
mal cut set outage probability and the consequent loss of load arising from the outages of
components belonging to a minimal cut set.
Finally, the thesis presents a novel framework to evaluate the impact of PEV charg-
ing loads on composite power system reliability. A Smart-OPF model combined with a
minimum cut set approach is proposed to evaluate the system reliability indices. Demand
response (DR) is included in the proposed procedure and its impact on system reliability
indices is studied. The procedure to determine the critical components of the power system
in the presence of PEV loads and DR is also proposed.
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Electric power systems can be very complex due to their geographic spread and the con-
sequent need for interconnections, and integration of different components such as trans-
formers, transmission lines, cables, generators, and loads. The electricity grid is designed
and operated to withstand any single and double contingencies by its protection and con-
trol system [1]. Therefore, power utilities seek to ensure an acceptable degree of system
reliability in the planning and operation of their systems. The power system, however, is
often subjected to abnormal effects, such as weather conditions, animals, human errors,
overload, and ageing, that can cause failure of a component.
Table 1.1 presents a fourteen-year historical outage statistics based on an eastern U.S.
utility's Outage Management System (OMS) Report for some causes that led components
to fail [2]. Power system planners and operators need to carry out reliability analysis
considering component outage and repair rates in order to ensure system availability and
prevent downtimes. Therefore, maintaining continuity and quality of supply, plays an
important role in power systems design and operation.
In recent years, energy resources (ER), demand response (DR), and plug-in electric
vehicles (PEV) are receiving considerable interest in the context of smart grids, and are
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Table 1.1: Failure Cause Statistics [2]
Overall System Transmission system
Distribution System
Overall System Overhead System Underground System
Animal 40 3 37 35 2
Tree Contact 8260 29 8231 8224 7
Overload 14 2 12 11 1
Work Error 6 0 6 6 0
Equipment Failure 1472 23 1449 1312 137
Lightning 2845 147 2968 2575 123
Accident 140 19 121 89 32
Prearranged 7 1 6 4 2
Customer Problem 122 9 113 109 4
Other 355 10 345 330 15
Total Number of Outages 13261 243 13288 12695 323
expected to play a significant role in system reliability, in the future. Therefore, it becomes
extremely important to develop tools that consider these options and can evaluate and
ensure the required degree of system reliability and continuity of service.
With the ever increasing demand for electricity, system planners are faced with a dif-
ficult task of identifying the exact size, location and year when ERs may be allowed to
penetrate the system over a planning horizon. Because of the multitudes of complex factors
influencing the decisions, it would be pertinent to adopt a top-down approach, where sys-
tem reliability is considered as the primary determinant to identify the appropriate sites,
sizes and years when ERs can be deployed.
ERs have gained attention as a practical option that can significantly improve the
power system operation and system reliability without introducing undesirable effects on
the environment. ERs also contribute to reducing transmission and distribution congestion,
provide spinning reserves, assist in demand-supply balance provisions, and reduce the need
for additional system generation, transmission and distribution capacity. The system and
nodal reliability indices can be improved by proper siting and sizing of ERs. There is a need
to investigate the impact of ERs on power system reliability and risk by identifying the
buses that suffer the highest loss of load. Clustering algorithms are unsupervised learning
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methods which structure a group of unclassified data with similar characteristics. There
methods can be applied on the data set of nodal reliability indices to arrive at the optimal
sizing and siting of ERs.
Identifying critical components in power systems play an important role in enhancing
the system reliability and reducing investment costs. Although over-investments in the
power sector can improve the system reliability, it often leads to high operational costs.
On the other hand, under-investments can lead to high maintenance costs in addition to
increasing the risk of power system outages and failures. Therefore, power system planners
and operators need a systematic method to identify the components, such as generators,
lines, transformers, etc., that are critical to the system, and target their investment plans
accordingly, instead of undertaking investments in a general manner.
The purchase of PEVs is rapidly increasing, thanks to the incentives offered by various
governments and the growing awareness of the contribution of PEVs to emissions reduction
from the transport sector. As of 2017, there are more than 28,000 PEVs on the road in
Canada, and counting [3]. With the complex charging behaviour of PEVs and the tendency
of charging loads to cluster within certain neighbourhoods or to occur at the same time
during the day, the electricity grid can be at risk, and need be investigated, given that
the grids are not inherently designed to accommodate PEV charging loads. Therefore,
it is necessary to accurately assess and quantify the impact of PEV charging loads on
system reliability in order to decide on the right actions such as developing the associated
infrastructure, upgrading the local equipment, and developing an appropriate scheduling
model that coordinates the charging of PEVs.
1.2 Literature Review
1.2.1 Impact of ERs on Power System Reliability
Power system planners and operators need information on component outages and repair
rates in order to ensure the availability of the system and prevent downtimes. Maintaining
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the continuity and quality of supply plays an important role in power system design and
operation. For decades, heuristic methods based on experimentation and rule-of-thumb
method were used in determining the reliability of power systems.
The concept of nodal minimal cut sets is proposed in [4] to understand the reliability
of serving customers at a specific load bus. The outage states of generators, transmission
lines, or both, are considered within a dc optimal power flow (OPF) model to determine
the minimal cut sets. Thereafter, Markov process is applied to the components of the
determined minimal cut sets instead of the entire system. In [5], a Markov cut set method is
developed to evaluate the reliability of a simple system comprising five components, where
the minimal cut sets are determined by using enumeration technique and connectivity
analysis. The methodology aims to evaluate the impact of failures from generation and
transmission systems on the distribution systems.
In [6], a random fuzzy model is presented to evaluate the failure probability of system
components due to weather, environment and other operating conditions. A system oper-
ational risk assessment method based on credibility theory is developed to accommodate
the two-fold uncertainty combining randomness and fuzziness in power system operations.
In [7], a combined fuzzy and probabilistic method is developed to calculate system risk
indices considering system component outage and load uncertainties. The fuzzy member-
ship functions of system component outages are developed using statistical records whereas
the system load is modeled using the hybrid method of fuzzy set and Monte Carlo simu-
lation.
In [8], several aspects of operational risk assessment of transmission systems are dis-
cussed. The operational risk during different timelines of adverse weather condition is
estimated once the component failure rates are calculated. The effect of weather parame-
ters on the momentary failure rate and operational risk is discussed.
In [9], a methodology using particle swarm optimization and genetic algorithm-based
optimization techniques is developed for autonomous microgrids to determine the optimal
sizing and siting of distributed generation (DG) units. Ranking the candidate buses for
DGs is carried out based on maximum loading limits, without causing voltage violations,
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to identify the optimal sites.
A dynamic programming based method is used to determine the optimal location and
size of ERs in [10]. The method considers the energy index of reliability in designing
microgrids to determine the optimal mix of resource types such as micro-turbines, solar PVs
and battery storages to satisfy electrical and thermal loads. The energy index reflects the
transmission adequacy of the system by considering transmission capacities, time varying
loads, and time varying capacities of the ERs.
The impact of ERs on distribution system reliability is discussed in [11]. A method
based on minimal cut sets and chronological Monte Carlo simulation is proposed to assess
the capacity transferred to other feeders and hence the impact on reliability indices of load
points taking into account DG penetrations.
The effect of natural disasters on microgrids is discussed in [12] wherein different mi-
crogrid models and two aspects that can affect their availability during natural disasters,
the lifeline performance and local energy storage, are studied. The availability of mi-
crogrid components such as micro-turbines, engine generators, DGs, converters, etc., are
determined using Markov state-space models via minimal cut set approximations.
In [13], a comprehensive evaluation model of reliability and cost for small isolated
systems containing renewable energy sources is presented. Simulation models are used to
generate reasonable atmospheric data, evaluate chronological renewable power outputs and
combine total energy and load to provide useful system indices.
In [12] different ER models study the effect of natural disasters on microgrid availability.
A method based on Markov state-space models is used to calculate the system availability
via minimal cut set approximations. In [14], a methodology based on the concept of
chronological power flow and a set of performance indices that minimize wind energy
spillage is used to determine the network reinforcements and possible integration of ERs.
In the same context, an iterative method based on the analysis of power flow continuation
is presented in [15] to determine the most sensitive buses to voltage collapse for optimally
allocating ERs. The work in [16] presents an optimization model to determine the optimal
set of decisions including siting, sizing, and time of investment for solar PV based ERs.
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The optimization model helps investors in their decision making by maximizing the net
present value of the profit. In [17], an expansion planning model is presented to optimally
design incentive rates for renewable ERs integration, and simultaneously considering sizing,
siting, and timing of new ER capacities to achieve a target renewable penetration level.
However, the ER planning models proposed in [12, 14–17] do not explicitly consider
reliability aspects, nor the uncertainty of outages of generation and transmission lines.
In [18], reliability is included in a stochastic programming model as an Expected Cost of
Load Loss (ECLL) for planning of multi-area power generation and transmission system.
The ECLL is approximated by considering only sample scenarios and then evaluated in
the optimization problem. In [19], a multi-area reliability-planning model is proposed,
based on convolution technique, to include generation Loss of Load Probability (LOLP),
expected unserved energy and covering the entire set of possible outage events. In [20], the
generation expansion planning problem takes into account the cost of Expected Energy
Not Supplied (EENS) to determine the optimal number of generators and their locations
in order to improve power system reliability. In [21], an OPF based technique is pro-
posed to evaluate the maximum feasible load levels and hence the load point reliabilities
considering the effect of ERs. The work in [22] studies the reliability level at each load
bus resulting from optimal generation planning. A stochastic programming with sample-
average approximation technique is proposed for the optimal placement incorporating some
reliability indices such as expected unserved energy and expected power loss.
In order to determine the candidate locations for ER installation, it is important to
understand how the resource will impact the adequacy of the location. Nodal adequacy
indices, such as Load Not Supplied per Interruption (LNSI) and Expected Demand Not
Supplied (EDNS) have been developed for this purpose [23]. The concept of nodal minimal
cut sets, proposed in [4], and calculated using a dc-OPF, helps understand the reliability
of serving customers at a load bus. In [11] the minimal cut sets are determined using an
enumeration technique and connectivity analysis. However, for a better understanding of
the adequacy needs at a location, it is important to consider both the active and reactive
power balance and voltage related factors. Thus a dc optimal power flow may not be
sufficient and there is a need for a full ac OPF based method to determine the nodal
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minimal cut sets.
A simplified method for reliability evaluation of power systems with wind generation
is presented in [24]. A wind speed model for different locations is developed first, then
the method is simplified by determining the minimum multi-state representation of a wind
farm model in reliability evaluation. The method requires historical wind speed data over
many years, in order to determine the necessary parameters of the wind speed models for
a specific wind farm location.
1.2.2 Critical Components
Power systems comprise generators, transformers, transmission lines, busses, and loads.
These components are scattered to cover a large geographical area; together, they are built
to maintain the continuity of generation, transmission, and consumption of energy. In ab-
normal operating conditions, such as severe weather, component breakdown, human error,
etc., the overall system may be affected, if an action is not taking. Therefore, power system
components should be prioritized as to which component outage may contribute more to
the violation of system stability or loading limits. Detecting critical components can help
system planners to make economic decisions on new investments in generation capacities
and transmission lines upgrades, also this information can help operators maintain the
delivery of electricity during system failure and disturbance events.
One of the indices used to measure the importance or criticality of a system component
is the traditional sensitivity analysis based Birnbaum’s measure, first introduced in 1969
[25]. It basically measures the maximum loss of the system when a component fails.
Mathematically, it is the partial derivative of system reliability at a specific time with
respect to failure rate of a component. In [26, 27], reliability importance indices of power
system components have been studied, where the classical component reliability importance
indices, such as the Birnbaum’s and Fussell-Vesely’s measure, are presented and compared
to indices that identify components as critical with respect to their impact on system
interruption cost.
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In [28], a method for quantifying and ranking of power system components with respect
to the system security margin, loss of load, and loss of energy, is presented. The method is
based on simulating outage events which causes the system to fail, and hence identifying
components associated with the interruptions. Different criticality indices are proposed
and assigned to each component based on their risk to power system security margin.
Reliability importance measures are applied to bulk power systems to mainly identify
weak-links [29]. The proposed measures are extended from popular importance measures,
such as Birnbaum, Fussell-Vesely, and Reliability Achievement Worth (RAW) measures to
make them compatible with electricity transmission systems. The work in [29] is based on
minimal cut sets pertaining to components outage rates and repair rates, instead of the
probability of failure for a specified time interval.
In [30], an importance index for power system generators is proposed adopting the con-
cept of game theory, namely Shapely Value Criterion. The proposed methodology aims to
prioritize generation units based on their failure impacts on bulk power system reliability.
The reliability index is first calculated by multiplying the probability and consequence of
a generator outage occurrence that result from Monte Carlo simulations and state enu-
meration, respectively. After that, the cost due to a generator outage is calculated using
the concept of Shapley Value where each generator’s contribution to the total cost of an
outage is used as an importance index.
In [31], the importance of components of a power substation such as bars, cables,
switches, transformers, and disconnector, is evaluated using time sequential Monte Carlo
simulation which is based on the mean time to failure (MTTF) and mean time to repair
(MTTR) parameters. The calculated indices rank the components in terms of which the
component failure causes a system failure, as well as, which component ensures a better
system reliability.
1.2.3 Impact of PEV Loads
Electrification of transportation is gaining trust nowadays as an alternative to the conven-
tional internal combustion engine (ICE) based vehicles. This transition will undoubtedly
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impact power systems in various aspects from increasing the system peak load, increas-
ing losses, and deterioration in voltage profile, to weakening the system reliability, despite
their numerous benefits such as reducing CO2 emissions and lowering transport costs. Nu-
merous studies have investigated the impact of PEVs on power systems, from different
perspectives.
In the context of distribution systems, a condition-dependent outage model is used
in [32] to determine the outage rate of transformers, which is then included in system
adequacy assessment considering PEV charging loads. A PEV smart charging strategy to
enhance the distribution adequacy while minimizing cost is hence proposed.
The impact of residential electric vehicle (EV) charging on distribution system voltages,
taking into account different factors such as EV load location, size, and percentage of
penetration, is presented in [33]. An optimization based model using dynamic programming
successive approximation method is carried out for each vehicle charging profile. It is noted
that the voltage drops decrease when the EV loads are closer to the service transformer,
decrease when the size of EV chargers are doubled, and increase at the secondary customer
locations when the penetration of EV is increased.
At the generation level, the impact of PEV charging demand on generation adequacy
is studied in [34] and [35] considering a coordinated bidirectional charging power control in
grid-to-vehicle (G2V) and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) modes. These studies conclude that the
risk of integration of PEVs to power systems can be reduced by charging power control
within the control capability of vehicles. It is noted that considering the EVs as conven-
tional load only may have a severe impact on power system reliability.
In [36], a stochastic unit commitment model is used to study the impact of PEVs on
power system operation and scheduling. The proposed model considers coordination of
thermal generators, wind generations, PEV charging loads, and ancillary services provided
by V2G modes. It is noted that smart charging PEV loads can reduce the operating cost
of the power system and compensate for the fluctuations in wind generation.
From the composite power system point of view, the reliability of an EV integrated
system in the battery exchange mode is studied in [37]. It is noted that the investment
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in battery exchange stations and its charging and discharging strategies should be coordi-
nated to achieve improved reliability performances of the system. The proposed method
uses information on travel and refuelling pattern data, adopted from the (U.S) National
Households Travel Survey (NHTS) [38] and the General Motor Refueling Pattern Sur-
vey [39], respectively.
In [40], a Monte Carlo simulation based approach is presented to determine the reli-
ability of composite power systems in the presence of PEV loads, but only considering
uncontrolled charging of the EVs. It is noted that the system LOLP is not significantly
affected when considering transmission lines outages. However, the penetration of PEVs,
even at nominal load levels, negativity impacts the system reliability, although smart charg-
ing impacts are not investigated.
In [41], several optimization models that minimize reliability indices, such as loss of
load expectation (LOLE) and EENS, in the presence of EVs are presented. Monte Carlo
simulation is carried out to produce sets of driving patterns and energy consumption data
that are applied in the optimization models. The work concludes that choosing a proper
charging/discharging strategy of EVs can improve system reliability, as well as EVs can
efficiently provide some system reserve.
1.3 Research Objectives
The main objectives of the research presented in this thesis are as follows:
 Develop a mathematical optimization model for composite power system planning to
identify the optimal site, size and year of installation of ERs. A reliability analysis
based framework will be proposed to obtain the nodal minimal cut sets and the
respective nodal adequacy indices, LNSIs. The nodal LNSI indices with their outage
probabilities need be clustered using the principle of classical K-means and Fuzzy C-
means clustering techniques, and the EDNS for each cluster will be obtained, based
on which the sizing and siting of ERs will be determined. Finally, an adequacy check
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algorithm to determine the earliest year of penetration of ERs will be applied to
maintain the system adequacy constraints.
 Develop an OPF based procedure combined with determining the system minimum
cut sets to identify the critical components in composite power systems, under steady-
state conditions and short-term operations. The objective is to rank each component
based on the minimal cut set outage probability and the consequent loss of load
arising from outages of components belonging to a minimal cut set.
 Examine the impact of uncontrolled vis-à-vis smart charging PEV loads on composite
power systems reliability, by developing a Smart-OPF model to determine the system
minimal cut sets, and hence the system reliability indices, taking into account various
degrees of smart charging penetration. The uncontrolled PEV charging load profile at
the system buses will be obtained using a data analysis technique with real mobility
data. Thereafter, the contribution of DR on damping the adverse impact of PEV
charging loads on system reliability will be investigated, and the critical components
of the system in the presence of PEV charging loads will be determined.
1.4 Outline of Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the background
on power system reliability, presents some basic definitions and basic approaches used in
power system reliability analysis. The definitions and applications of ERs, DR, and PEVs
are discussed. A brief background to clustering techniques is also presented. Chapter 3
presents a novel clustering technique based approach to determine the optimal location
and size of ERs in power systems. Systematic approaches to apply the K-means and
Fuzzy C-means clustering techniques on a set of reliability indices, which are determined
using the nodal minimal cut sets, are presented to determine the location and size of ERs.
Finally, using an adequacy check algorithm, the earliest year of penetration of each ER is
obtained. Chapter 4 presents an OPF based method to determine the system minimal cut
sets of a composite power system and hence identify the critical components of the system.
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This chapter focuses on the evaluation of composite system reliability under steady state
conditions, and assessing operational risks in real-time system operations. Each component
is ranked based on minimal cut set outage probability and the consequent loss of load
arising from outages of components belonging to a minimal cut set. Chapter 5 presents
a novel Smart-OPF model combined with a minimum cut set approach to evaluate the
impact of PEV charging loads on composite power system reliability. Thereafter, DR is
included in the proposed procedure and its impact on system reliability indices is studied.
Ranking of components by their criticality in the presence of PEV charging loads and DR
is also presented. Finally, Chapter 6 presents the main conclusions and contributions of




The electric power system is the most complex system to have ever been built by mankind.
The basic function of a power system is to deliver electricity to customers as reliably
and economically as possible [23]. A brief overview of power system reliability evaluation
is presented in this chapter including some basic concepts of power system reliability.
Thereafter, the definitions and applications of ERs, DR, and PEVs are discussed. Finally,
a brief background to clustering techniques is presented.
2.1 Power System Reliability
Power system reliability is a measure of the ability of the system to meet the load re-
quirements within acceptable standards over a period of several years. In other words,
reliability can be defined as the probability that a system or component will perform a
required function under stated conditions for a stated period of time [42]. According to
the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), reliability is defined as “the
degree to which the performance of the elements of the electrical system results in power
being delivered to customers within accepted standards and in the amount desired” [43].
Power system reliability is based on the concepts of system adequacy and system secu-




System Adequacy System Security 
Figure 2.1: Explaining power system reliability [23].
supply all energy demand requirements at all times. System adequacy is associated with
system steady-state conditions and offers information on future system behavior that can
be used in system planning. Security, on the other hand, is the ability of the system to
avoid service interruption under sudden disturbances. System security is associated with
the dynamic and transient real-time system operations, such as generator and transmission
line contingencies and generation uncertainties [23,42].
Due to the large-scale and complexity of practical power systems, reliability evaluation
can be divided into three zones, i.e., generation, transmission, and distribution, organized
into three hierarchical levels (HLs) as hierarchical level 1 (HL-I), hierarchical level 2 (HL-
II) and hierarchical level 3 (HL-III) as shown in Fig. 2.2 [45]. Reliability studies can be
applied to any zone alone, to the combined zones of generation and transmission (HL-II),
or to the combined zones of generation, transmission and distribution (HL-III).
Reliability assessment at HL-I considers generating capacity adequacy evaluation to
meet the total system demand. At HL-II, reliability evaluation of the composite system
comprising generation and transmission is considered to examine the ability of the system
to deliver electrical energy to all the load points within accepted standards and in the
amount desired. Studies also include generation rescheduling and load shedding options.
In composite power system reliability assessment, it is challenging to quantify the in-
dices as it is mandatory to include detailed modelling of generation units, transmission lines


































Figure 2.2: Reliability assessment hierarchical levels [23].
systems is the large computational burden involved to determine most significant indices
which are related to load curtailment and expected outage events. Components considered
in a composite power system reliability study comprise among others, generators, trans-
formers, lines, reactors, relays, and loads. The research presented in this thesis focuses on
HL-II analysis.
An overall reliability assessment, HL-III, considers all the three zones simultaneously,
and is an extremely problem because of the large-scale modeling and computation involved.
Thus, distribution system reliability studies are usually performed separately, which is
beyond the scope of this thesis.
Independent outages are those outages of different components which does not affect the
probability of outage of the others. Single or multiple independent outages or overlapping
outages are the easiest to evaluate and many evaluation methods are available assuming
that all the component outages are independent [23]. The research described in this thesis
concentrates on independent outages.
The conventional two-state model, shown in Fig. 2.3, represents the probabilistic be-
havior of most generators and lines, and the basic data required for this model are failure
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rates and repair rates. For multiple independent outages, the model adopted for reliability




 Figure 2.3: Two-state model.
2.1.1 Reliability Measures
Failure Rate (λ) and Mean Time to Failure (MTTF)
Failure rate is the probability that a component is online during a time interval F . In
other words, it is the number of failures of a component per unit measurement of time.
Failure rate, as one of the important reliability indices, specifies the rate of system aging.
It is generally expressed in failures per hour and often denoted by λ. A failure occurs if
any component causes power interruption or abnormal voltage profile.
MTTF is the expected or average time of a component to fail. MTTF is the inverse of
the failure rate. From Fig. 2.4, we have,
F = MTTF = 1/λ (2.1)
Repair Rate (µ) and Mean Time to Repair (MTTR)
The repair rate is the probability that a component is recovered and restored to service
in time R that is less than time F . The repair time represents the time taken to locate
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the failed component, diagnose, repair or replace, test, and resume to the system. It is
generally expressed in repairs per hour and often denoted by µ.
MTTR is the expected time taken to repair a failed component. MTTR is the inverse
of the repair rate. From Fig. 2.4, we have,
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Figure 2.4: System operation and breakdown.
System/Component Availability
Availability is the probability of a system or a component being in service and operating.
By modeling the system components in series and parallel as interconnections, system
availability can be determined.
In order to determine the component availability, let us assume that a component has
two states: available and unavailable. The conventional two-state model, shown in Fig.
2.3 is adopted for reliability assessment.
Figure 2.3 indicates the state transition diagram for a two-state device. The model
includes an UP (In Service /Available) state and a DOWN (Outage/Unavailable) state. If
failures and repairs are exponentially distributed, the probability of a component cm on
outage at a time t, i.e., unavailability of cm, given that it was operating successfully at








In steady-state condition, i.e., t = ∞, the unavailability or the Forced Outage Rate








The reliability indices are used by planners and operators to determine the likelihood of
interruption of supply and are often defined using the concept of minimal cut sets [42]. A
cut set in the context of power systems, is a set of system components such as generators,
loads, transformers, lines, etc., which, when fails, causes failure of the system. The minimal
cut set, a subset of the cut set, is one, which when fails, causes system failure but when
any one of its components has not failed, does not cause system failure. This implies that
all components of a minimal cut set must be in the failure state to cause a system failure.
The research presented in this work is based on determining the minimal cut sets for the
system or for a certain load bus.
Adequacy Indices
The calculation of reliability and risk indices involve determining which combination of
component outages result in interruptions and then calculating the probability of these
contingencies occurring.
Two sets of adequacy indices– system indices and nodal indices, are used in composite
power systems. They are complementary rather than alternative [23]. System indices are
necessary for both planners and operators to determine the likelihood of interruption of
supply, while nodal indices provide information on the most important nodes during system
disturbances. Both sets can be categorized as annualized and annual indices. Annualized
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indices are calculated considering the system load as a constant load; the annual peak load
is normally used. Annual indices are calculated considering the time-varying load on a
year. The indices of interest, for both system and buses, in this work are the following [23]:
 Loss of Load Probability (LOLP ): calculated by adding the probabilities of all
states that cause load curtailment. The calculation of reliability and risk indices
involve determining which combination of component outages result in interruptions
and then calculating the probability of these contingencies occurring. The LOLP of
a power system can be calculated using cut sets, as follows:
– Step-1: Calculate the probability of failure of a given component at time t, using
(2.3) for operational risk assessment and at time t =∞ (steady-state) using (2.4)
for determination of unavailability or FOR.
– Step-2: Multiply the probability of failure of each individual component that con-
struct a cut set and obtain p(C̄h)


















p(C̄h ∩ C̄l ∩ C̄m)t...(−1)w−1p(C̄1 ∩ C̄2 ∩ ...C̄w)t (2.6)
However, determining cut set probabilities is a difficult and time-consuming exercise
for large and complex systems which needs to consider all the cut sets. To overcome
the computational complexity of LOLP tSys in (2.6), approximations can be made
in the evaluation by using the upper bound approximation (first term of (2.6)) by
summing the minimal cut set probabilities of system failure as discussed in [42], and
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The results obtained with this approximation, although not very accurate, allows
fast calculation of system reliability and risk. The degree of inaccuracy introduced,
is usually negligible and often within the tolerance associated with the data of the
component reliabilities for a system with high values of component reliability.
The LOLP and operational risk of nodes that suffer loss of load can now be calculated
in the same way as discussed before where (2.6) of Step-3 is modified to consider the














p(C̄h ∩ C̄l ∩ C̄m)ti...(−1)w−1p(C̄1 ∩ C̄2 ∩ ...C̄w)ti (2.8)
The upper bound approximation can also be applied to speed up the nodal reliability








 Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE): Summation of the probability of failure, as-






p(C̄h) ∀ C̄h. (2.10)
 Load Not Supplied per Interruption (LNSIC̄h): Denotes the real power load
curtailment when a minimal cut set C̄h causes a system failure, measured in MW per
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disturbance; in a p.u. system as p.u. per disturbance.
 Expected Demand Not Supplied (EDNS): Summation of the products of the
probability of failure associated with a minimal cut set and the corresponding LNSIC̄h




p(C̄h).LNSIC̄h ∀ hr. (2.11)
 Expected Energy Not Supplied (EENS): The sum of EDNS over 24 hours deter-





2.1.2 Operational Risk Assessment of Power Systems
Risk and reliability are the two aspects of measuring the ability of the electric power system
to meet the load requirements within accepted standards and in the amount desired. Both,
risk and reliability are associated with each other. Higher risk means lower reliability, and
vice versa. Operational risk assessment is the probability that a system or component will
perform a required function under stated conditions during a short period of time.
The first major operational risk assessment was published in 1963 by PJM Intercon-
nection [47]. In this approach, the unit commitment risk is applied to the operational
planning of generation units. A procedure is presented for determining operating reserve
requirements to maintain a uniform level of risk in the day-to-day operation, taking into
account the changing load level, the variability of the load, and the size of units scheduled,
so that the spinning reserve capacity in any part of the system can be fully available in
any other part of the system [48].
Risk assessment of power systems cover a time scale of hours (T), called a lead time with
a known initial operational state [8]. The operating conditions of the system components
are uncertain, which render the probability of outage of the components continuously
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changing. For instance, during severe weather, the failure rate of overhead lines can increase
significantly as T increases. The system operational risk can be determined in the same















2.1.3 Basic Approaches to Reliability Evaluation
Several techniques are reported in the literture dealing with reliability evaluation of power
systems. The criteria applied to assess the composite system reliability can be categorized
as deterministic or probabilistic [49].
The Deterministic Approach
The deterministic approach is an old and simple method used by system planners to eval-
uate the system performance and maintain system security in different scenarios based on
past experience. The most common deterministic method is the N-1 criterion. Based on
this criterion, if a system is able to operate, supply load and remain stable after any single
unplanned outage (one line or one generator) that may occur, the system will be considered
reliable. The main advantage of the deterministic approach is its straightforwardness to
implement and the easiness to understand. However, the difficulty to determine the degree
of system unreliability, which fails under more than one scenario, limits the applications
of this method [49].
The Probabilistic Approach
The probabilistic approach provides a better understanding of system behavior and allo-
cation of resources. The benefit of using the probabilistic approach is in incorporating
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uncertain events in the system. The most common types of uncertainties are the com-
ponents state, the weather, and the load. Stochastic models are used to represent these
uncertainties.
The probabilistic approach is categorized as analytical methods and simulation (Monte
Carlo simulation) methods [23]. The analytical methods represent the system behavior by
mathematical models and evaluate the system reliability using direct numerical solutions.
Some of the analytical methods in use are cut set, Markov, and equivalent method. The
simulation methods, on the other hand, estimate the system reliability based on simulating
a series of random sampling of scenarios, such as Monte Carlo simulations.
In the reliability evaluation of power systems, the states of power system components
are usually assumed to be independent and the methods used to calculate the system
reliability are based on the multiplication rule of probabilities [4, 50]. The application of
probability techniques based on a series of approximate equations to calculate failure rates
and component unavailabilities of simple systems is presented in [51,52]. The mathematical
expressions to calculate various measures of reliability are based on series and parallel
connections criteria employing probability theory.
2.2 Energy Resources (ERs) and Demand Response
(DR)
Reliability improvements can be achieved by implementing ERs and DR in power systems
which also contribute to reducing transmission and distribution congestion, provide spin-
ning reserve, assist in demand-supply balance provisions, and reduce the need for additional
system generation, transmission and distribution capacity.
ERs are on-site small-scale power sources or storage technologies that can be managed
and coordinated to provide power where it is needed, and has been defined over a broad
range of capacities, ranging from 3 kW to 50 MW [53]. In other words, any distributed
generation (DG) resource or demand-side management (DSM) measure is referred to as an
ER.
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Outage probability for a component in the system is discussed in Section 2.1.1; in the
same way, the probability of failure of an ER can be obtained as follows:
1. Time-dependent probability of failure:
It is assumed that the ER is only available when needed, which means, the ER serves
as a supplemental reserve with a response time of tin hours and a start-up failure
probability of pstER, where before an instant takes effect the unavailability has been
taken equal to zero. This is a generic representation, and for tin = 0, the ER can be









2. Steady-state probability of failure:







Furthermore, DR refers to various programs that engage customers to reduce or shift
their electricity usage from peak hours in response to incentive payments or time-based
tariffs. Two types of DR are currently available: incentive-based and time-based rates [54].
Incentive-based DR programs can be categorized into four types, as given in Table 2.1:
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Table 2.1: Categories of Incentive-Based DR [54]
Program Definition Target
Direct load control Cycling of end-use devices, such as smart thermostat Residential and small commercial
Demand buy back
Customers respond to curtail upon request for a speci-
fied period and price Commercial and industrial
Demand bidding
Customers bid load reduction into utility or market on
advance Commercial and industrial
Interruptible rate
Offering discounted rates or credits for customers willing
to curtail operations or power up the grid using DGs Commercial and industrial
Ancillary-services market
On contract customers receive payment for agreeing to
reduce load when called to ensure power system relia-
bility
Commercial and industrial
On the other hand, time-based DR programs can be classified to three types, as given
in Table 2.2:
Table 2.2: Categories of Time-Based DR [54]
Program Definition
Time of use (TOU) pricing
Prices set for a specific time period on a forward basis, usually not changing more than
two times a year
Critical peak
Established TOU prices in effect except for critical peak load days or hours, on which a
critical peak price is in effect
Real-time pricing Prices vary based on the market
Most of the work on DR examines the system impact at the distribution level or develops
DR market design frameworks [55, 56]. No work is reported on how DR can impact the
reliability of a composite power system.
2.3 Electric Vehicles (EVs)
The innovation of EVs goes back to the 1830s, however, with the revolution of fuel-powered
ICE, alongside cheap supply of abundant oil in the early 1900s led to successful improve-
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ments and wide availability of motor-fuel cars; therefore, the interest in EVs had mostly
died down.
With the current growing interest in EVs and soaring gas prices, driven by a foreseeable
fossil fuel depletion in the future, with the developments in the automotive sector and
driven by environmental concerns, penetration of EV loads is increasing. In 2010, the
Electric Vehicle Incentive Program (EVIP) was introduced by the government of Ontario,
Canada, offering up to $14,000 rebate on the purchase of an EV, encouraging Ontarians
to shift to low- or zero-emission vehicles as part of an overall government strategy to cut
greenhouse gas emissions [3, 57].
2.3.1 Types of Electric Vehicles
Battery Electric Vehicle (BEV):
This type of EVs is powered by electric motors fed by batteries and the traditional ICE
is not used. The BEV batteries can be recharged by plugging in to an external electric
power source. Charging time varies from half an hour to overnight depending on the level
of charging (Level-1 or Level-2). The typical driving range of BEVs is between 135 ∼ 425
km. Example of BEVs are Tesla Model S, Ford Focus EV, Nissan Leaf, Chevrolet Bolt,
Chevrolet Spark, Hyundai IONIQ, Kia Soul EV, Mitsubishi i-MiEV, and Smart Fortwo.
Hybrid Electric Vehicle (HEV):
HEVs have two complementary drive systems, powered by electric and fuel motors, com-
bining the benefits of low emissions and high fuel economy. These type of EVs are not
manufactured to be plugged in to an external electrical source to recharge the battery;
instead, the battery is recharged through the regenerative braking and the ICE during
driving. Typically, in the electric power mode, the driving range is less than 10 km. Ex-
ample of HEVs are Chevrolet Volt Hybrid, Hyundai Sonata Plug-in Hybrid, Honda Civic
Hybrid, and Toyota Prius Plug-in Hybrid.
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Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV):
The mechanical process of the PHEVs are similar to the HEVs. In addition, the PHEVs
can be plugged in to an electric power source to recharge the battery unlike HEVs. With
the larger battery capacity, PHEVs can offer up to 60 km to drive using the electric mode
until the state of charge (SOC) of the battery is very depleted. This is commonly referred
to as an AER (all electric range). Example of PHEVs are Audi A3 Sportback e-tron,
BMW i8, Fiat Chrysler Pacifica, Ford C-Max, Mercedes-Benz S550E, Porsche Cayenne,
and Volvo XC90.
2.3.2 Electric Vehicle Charging Levels
Battery charging of EVs that can be plugged in to the power grid is either carried out
conveniently at home or publicly at a charging station. Majority of EV charging occurs
overnight at homes when the electricity price is cheaper. Charging times vary, based on
different factors, such as the level of charging, battery type, battery SOC, and battery
capacity. Charging levels, available currently or still under development, are presented in
Table 2.3 [33,58]:
Table 2.3: EVs Charging Levels [33, 58]
Primary Use Current Type Amperage Voltage Power Kilometers of Range
(A) (V) (kW) per Charging Time
Residential charging AC 12-16 110/120, 1φ 1.3-1.9
3.2 -8 km of range
Level 1
per hour of charging
Residential and
AC Up tp 80 208/240, 1φ Up to 19.2
16 -24 km of range
Level 2
public charging per hour of charging
Level 3
Public charging AC TBD 400/600, 3φ TBD
96 -128 km of range
(under development) in less than 30 minutes
Public charging DC Up tp 200 Up to 600 Up to 240
96 -128 km of range
DC Fast Chargers
in less than 30 minutes
*TBD: to be determined
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2.3.3 PEV Controlled Charging Schemes
Several PEV charging schemes may be adopted depending on the EV controllability. The
charging profile is constructed based on charging duration and starting time of charging.
The behaviour of PEV drivers has a direct impact on the starting time of charging and
hence the charging profile. Therefore, controlled charging can be categorized as follows [59]:
 Smart Charging - this strategy envisions an active management system moving the
PEV charging load from the on-peak to off-peak hours where the EV aggregating
entity will monitor EVs usage controlling overload penetrations and excessive voltage
drops.
 Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) - is an extension of smart charging, and considers bidirectional
power flow between the PEV and the grid. It assumes that during the on-peak hours,
the excess battery power will be utilized to push excess power into the grid for the
provision of ancillary services.
2.4 Clustering Technique
Clustering is an important unsupervised learning technique that structures a group of un-
classified data with similar characteristics. Clustering analysis plays an important role in
many applications of different fields including psychology, social sciences, biology, statis-
tics, pattern recognition, information retrieval, machine learning, and data mining [60].
Different clustering techniques are available, and each may provide different grouping for
a data set. Based on the output desired, a particular method can be selected.
Popular clustering techniques such as Fuzzy C-means, self-organizing map, K-means,
extreme learning machine, etc., are studied in [61–67] in the context of power engineering
applications, although these studies are not used for the purpose of reliability assessment.
The use of clustering techniques in load profiling is to partition the initial data sample and
group them into classes according to their load characteristics to develop load patterns,
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which is significant for load control [61], tariff purposes [62, 66], load forecasting [63],
locational customer services [63, 67], power system analysis [63, 66, 67], and estimating
non-technical losses affecting power utilities [64]. In the literature, various methods of
clustering load curves have been proposed. In [61], the combination of Auto Regression
Moving Average (ARMA) modeling technique and genetic based K-means algorithm is
utilized to classify the direct load control curves of customer behavior pertaining to use
of air conditioners. Different stages of data mining models based on unsupervised and
supervised learning techniques is applied in [62] to create load patterns for tariff purposes.
Classification of loads in terms of time-varying power consuming behavior is referred in [63].
Historical load curves are used to create a fuzzy relation matrix based approach to the
clustering problem. Further, a data mining model is presented in [64], where the analysis
is mainly applied to customer consumption behavior to detect non-technical losses.
K-Means Clustering Algorithm
K-means was first introduced by James MacQueen in 1967 [47]. It is one of the sim-
plest unsupervised learning algorithm and easiest to implement in solving many practical
clustering problems. The most common approach used to determine the cluster centers
is based on minimizing the sum of squared distances from each data point to its cluster
center. K-means is typically applied to objects in a continuous n-dimensional space [60],
and data clustering is achieved by a simple K-means partitional clustering algorithm.
The main idea is to choose K initial means (centroids), where K is the number of
clusters desired. Each data point is then assigned to the nearest mean. Each group of
points assigned to the same mean forms a cluster. The algorithm updates cluster means,
by minimizing the error of the Sum of Squares Function (SSF) considering the Euclidean
distance from each data point to its mean, until no point changes clusters or until the
means remain the same. The standard operation of the K-means clustering algorithm is
demonstrated in Fig. 2.5.
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Step-1: Choose K initial means 
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K initial means
Step-2: Assigned points to nearest mean
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K initial means
Step-3: Minimize SSF and re-calculate new means Step-4: Re-group points to closest mean. Update means 
by carrying out Step-3 and Step-4 untill all means remain 
the same
Figure 2.5: Demonstration of K-means clustering algorithm.
Fuzzy C-Means Clustering Algorithm
The Fuzzy C-means clustering algorithm was developed by Dunn in 1973 [68,69] then it was
improved by Bezdek in 1981 [69,70]. In fuzzy clustering, each data point has a probability
to belong to more than one cluster, unlike the K-means technique, with different degrees of
membership based on its distance from the mean of a cluster. Each data point is only then
assigned to the cluster with the highest degree of membership [60, 71]. The criterion of
goodness is a modified version of the SSF. Both algorithms, K-means and Fuzzy C-means,
are classified as partitional clustering algorithms and aim to find best partition of dataset
into number of clusters.
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2.5 Summary
In this chapter an attempt was made to present a brief background on power system relia-
bility and some basic approaches used in power system reliability analysis. The definitions
of power system reliability, adequacy and security, as well as reliability hierarchical levels
were briefly discussed. This chapter also presented a brief description of operational risks
in power system operation. Thereafter, the definitions and applications of ERs, DR, and
PEVs were discussed. Finally, the concepts of K-means and Fuzzy C-means clustering
techniques were discussed briefly.
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Chapter 3
Clustering Technique Applied to
Nodal Reliability Indices for Optimal
Planning of Energy Resources‡
3.1 Introduction
Electric power systems are facing major challenges because of the increase in penetration
of ERs. This chapter focuses on composite system reliability based planning for ERs, and
presents novel clustering techniques based approaches to determine the optimal location,
size and year of installation of ERs in the system. The K-means clustering and Fuzzy
C-means clustering techniques are applied to the set of reliability indices, LNSI, which are
determined using nodal minimal cut sets. The nodal minimal cutsets are obtained using
an OPF based approach in this chapter. Once the optimal sizes and locations of ERs are
Parts of this chapter have been published in: B. Lami and K. Bhattacharya, Clustering technique based
siting and sizing of distributed energy resources considering nodal reliability and risk, IEEE Transactions
on Power Systems, vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 4679-4690, Nov. 2016.
*An earlier versions of this work was presented in: B. Lami and K. Bhattacharya, “Power system
reliability and operational risk evaluation using minimal cut sets,” CIGRÉ Canada Conference-Modernizing
the Grid to Better Serve Evolving Customer Needs, Calgary, Alberta, Canada Sept 2013.
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obtained, the earliest year of penetration is determined using an adequacy check algorithm.
Detailed studies presented considering the IEEE RTS demonstrate the applicability of the
proposed technique.
3.2 OPF Based Determination of Nodal Minimal Cut
Sets
The concept of nodal minimal cut sets was first reported in [4] for reliability evaluation
of composite power systems. In order to understand the reliability of serving load at a
specific bus, it is necessary to determine location specific reliability indices. A select set of
minimal cut sets, when are on outage, and if that results in the loss of load at a particular
bus, this set of minimal cut sets is termed as the nodal minimal cut set for that bus.
A new method is developed in this chapter building upon the work in [4], to obtain the
select set of nodal minimal cut sets that result in loss of load at a bus, (C̄h)i, as described
in Fig. 3.1 and in the following step-wise procedure:
 Step-1: Select a cut set of first order, i.e., each generator or each line is considered
individually as a first order cut set.
 Step-2: Execute the OPF with this cut set on outage.
 Step-3: If there is a loss of load at any bus (PdUNMi 6= 0) then this cut set is a first order
minimal cut set. Then,
1. Calculate the probability of failure of this minimal cut set, p(C̄h), by multiplying
the probability of failure of each individual component that construct this minimal
cut set.
2. Associate buses with unserved loads to this minimal cut set, (C̄h)i, and to its
probability, p(C̄h)i.
3. The load not supplied at bus i, because of this outage is denoted by LNSIC̄h,i.
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If there is no loss of load at any bus, then go to Step-2 with new first order cut set and
check for loss of load at a bus. Continue until all first order cut sets are considered to
be on outage and hence form the complete list of first order nodal minimal cut sets.
 Step-4: Select a second order cut set, i.e., a combination of two elements, which may be
a generator-generator, generator-line, or line-line pair. Carry out Step-2 and Step-3 to
determine the complete list of second order nodal minimal cut sets.
 Step-5: Continue Step-1 to Step-4 to determine higher order combinations of outages of
system components, and hence higher order nodal minimal cut sets.
It should be noted that, since the unserved load at a bus need be modelled as a variable,
so as to determine the nodal minimal cut sets, a simple power flow analysis is inadequate,
and an OPF becomes necessary. Two objective functions are considered for the OPF,
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The above objectives are subjected to the following equality and inequality constraints:
1. Nodal active and reactive power balance: is ensured by the power flow equations
which also include PDUNM andQDUNM , the real and reactive power load curtailment
variables, respectively, that may arise from the outages of various components.
Pgi − Pdi + PdUNMi =
N∑
j=1
|Vi||Vj||Yij|cos(θij + δj − δi), (3.3)
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Qgi −Qdi +QdUNMi = −
N∑
j=1
|Vi||Vj||Yij|sin(θij + δj − δi). (3.4)
2. Limits on bus voltages:
V Mini ≤ |Vi| ≤ V Maxi . (3.5)
3. Limits on active and reactive power generation:
PgMini ≤ Pgi ≤ PgMaxi , (3.6)
QgMini ≤ Qgi ≤ QgMaxi . (3.7)
4. Power flow limits of transmission lines:
|Sij| ≤ SMaxij . (3.8)
5. Limits on load curtailment:
0 ≤ PdUNMi ≤ Pdi, (3.9)
0 ≤ QdUNMi ≤ Qdi. (3.10)
3.3 Optimal Allocation of ERs Using Clustering Tech-
nique
The LNSIC̄h,i and their respective p(C̄h)i are determined considering the system under
outage conditions, as discussed in the previous section. A suitable approach to organize
the large number of LNSIC̄h,i data with their respective p(C̄h)i for a given bus, considering
the large number of possible combinations of outages, is to use clustering algorithms for the
terminal year, which are based on the nearest centroid sorting algorithm. In this chapter,
two well known clustering approaches, the K-means clustering and the Fuzzy C-means
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combination?
           Calculate             at affected buses  
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𝑝 𝐶 ℎ 𝑖  
Figure 3.1. Schematic for determining nodal minimal cut sets and adequacy indices.
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clustering are used for siting and sizing of ERs based on the calculation of EDNS, as
discussed next.
3.3.1 Using K-Means Clustering
In the K-means clustering technique, data clustering is achieved by a simple K-means
partitional clustering [60]. The main idea is to initiate K number of means (centroids),
where K is the desired number of clusters. Each data point is then assigned to the nearest
mean. Each group of points assigned to the same mean forms a cluster. The algorithm
updates cluster means by minimizing the error of the sum of squares function considering
the Euclidean distance from each data point to its mean. The proposed K-means clustering
algorithm is described in Fig. 3.2, and the step-wise procedure is as follows:
 Step-1: Identify all nodal minimal cut sets associated with each bus, (C̄h)i, their failure
probabilities, p(C̄h)i, and corresponding values of LNSIC̄h,i, for the terminal year.





 Step-3: Choose the desired number of clusters, K.
 Step-4: Choose initial values of cluster means (centroids), mea, within the data domain.
 Step-5: Calculate Within Cluster Sum of Squared Error, (WCSSE) considering the





















to the closest cluster mean and
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 Step-7: Update cluster means by carrying out Step-5 and Step-6 untill all cluster means
retain the same value between iterations.




(a) to their original buses and cluster those with
the same mea.
 Step-9: Calculate EDNS of each cluster, at each bus, EDNSa,i, using nodal minimal










∀ C̄h ∈ a, i. (3.13)
 Step-10: For every bus, find the highest EDNSa,i.
 Step-11: Identify buses with clusters that have EDNSa,i higher than system adequacy.
Those are major sites that require ERs. A bus is considered a valid candidate for ER if
its adequacy exceeds the plan criteria.
 Step-12: The y-coordinate of a cluster mean indicates the size of the ER.
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Figure 3.2. Optimal siting and sizing of ERs using K-means clustering technique.
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3.3.2 Using Fuzzy C-Means Clustering
Fuzzy C-means is a clustering technique that allows every data point to belong to more
than one cluster with different degrees of membership based on its distance from the mean
of a cluster. Each data point is only then assigned to the cluster with the highest degree
of membership [60, 71]. The criterion of goodness is a modified version of the WCSSE
(3.11) [60]. Fuzzy clustering is carried out through an iterative optimization of the objective













where uC̄h,i,a ∈ [0,1] is the degree of membership of a data point and α > 1 is the shape
parameter of the membership function [60].
The application of the Fuzzy C-means clustering algorithm to determine the optimal
sizing and siting of ERs is described in the step-wise procedure, as follows:
 Step-1: Carry out Step-1 to Step-4 from K-means clustering algorithm, discussed earlier.
 Step-2: Initialize U = [uC̄h,i,a](h,N)×C matrix, U
(z=0).
where U is the fuzzy partition matrix and z is iteration steps.





































 Step-5: Repeat Step-3 and Step-4 until ||U(z+1) −U(z)|| < ε.
where ε is a termination criterion ∈ [0,1].




to the cluster with highest degree of mem-
bership.
 Step-7: Carry out Step-8 to Step-12 from K-means clustering algorithm, discussed ear-
lier.
The core procedure of this clustering technique is shown in Fig. 3.3, essentially the
steps within the dotted box in Fig. 3.2 are replaced by the dotted box in Fig. 3.3 to arrive
at the complete Fuzzy C-means clustering technique.
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(z = 0)
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Carry out Step-8 to Step-12 from K-means clustering algorithm
Figure 3.3. Optimal siting and sizing of ERs using Fuzzy C-means clustering technique.
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3.3.3 Optimal Year of Allocations of ERs
The proper allocation of ERs over the plan period is an important issue and can signifi-
cantly impact the system reliability. The two proposed clustering technique based meth-
ods determines the candidate buses for ERs along with their sizes, at the terminal year of
planning. As described in Fig. 3.4, considering the list of ERs in decreasing order of their
EDNS, with associated sizes and locations, the proposed algorithm examines LOLPSys
(2.7), starting from year-1. If the LOLPSys at year-1 does not meet the desired reliability
target (LOLPtarg) of the system, penetrate as much ERs to achieve the adequacy level.
However, if the LOLPSys at year-1 is met, examine the next year and so on, up until the
terminal year.
Year = 1
Calculate LOLPYear as per (2.7)
Is
LOLPYear < LOLPtarg








with current highest 
ranked available ER 




Figure 3.4. Schematic for optimal year of planning ERs.
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3.4 Case Study: Analysis and Results
The proposed clustering technique based siting and sizing of ERs considering nodal relia-
bility indices, determined using minimal cut sets, is tested on the IEEE RTS [73] shown
in Fig. 3.5. This system is specially designed by the IEEE Task Force on Power System
Reliability and provides all relevant data of lines, generators and outages. There are 32
generators ranging from 12 MW to 400 MW in capacity, 24 buses, and 38 transmission
lines and transformers. The system has an annual peak load of 2,850 MW and 580 Mvar,
and the annual peak load is assumed to increase 1% per year, over ten years. The system
installed generation capacity is 3,405 MW. The transmission network comprises lines at
138 kV and 230 kV voltage levels. All per unit quantities refer to active power (MW),
reactive power (Mvar) or complex power (MVA) with a base of 100 MVA. The LNSI and
EDNS indices, both denote active power in per unit. Relevant data of the IEEE RTS is
given in Appendix A.
3.4.1 Determine (C̄h)i and LNSIC̄h,i for Terminal Year
The nodal minimal cut sets, (C̄h)i, are identified by using the method discussed in Section
III. The minimal cut sets are determined up to the third-order, in this chapter, in order to
keep the computational burden within reasonable limits, but without any loss of generality.
It is to be noted that both the objective functions J1 (3.1) and J2 (3.2) are considered
separately to determine the minimal cut sets and consequently parallel set of results are
obtained. This is to examine how the choice of the OPF objective function impacts the
selection of minimal cut sets and hence the optimal planning of ER. There are 1483 minimal
cut sets up to the third order for the terminal year (year-10), for the IEEE RTS under
study with J1 objective while 1595 minimal cut sets with J2 objective (Table 3.1).
The first-order minimal cut sets are determined considering a single component outage
at a time, either a generator or a transmission line. For each outage case, if there is loss of
load at a bus, the particular component on outage, becomes a first-order minimal cut set.
As observed from Table 3.1, there are three first-order minimal cut sets of generator only,
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Figure 3.5. IEEE Reliability Test System [73].
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in the IEEE RTS, with either objectives.
The second-order minimal cut sets are determined considering the simultaneous out-
age of two components of the system, i.e. two generators, two transmission lines, or one
generator and one transmission line. For each outage case, if there is loss of load at a
bus, the two components on simultaneous outage form a second-order minimal cut set, if
neither of them is a first-order minimal cut set. In Table 3.1, it is seen that there are 118
second-order minimal cut sets with either objectives, where both components are genera-
tors, 15 minimal cut sets where both components are transmission lines; and 59 with J1
and 60 with J2 second-order minimal cut sets of generator-line pairing. In the same way,
the third-order minimal cut sets for the IEEE RTS are also determined, as shown in Table
3.1.
It is noted that the choice of the objective function has some Impact on the number of
minimal cut sets, but whether this difference in minimal cut sets impacts the sizing and
siting decisions of ER need to be examined, and is presented in the later sections.
Table 3.1: Base Case Minimal Cut Sets
Cut Set Component(s) Number of Minimal Cut Sets
Order on Outage J1 J2
1
Generator Only (1G) 3 3
Line Only (1L) None None
2
Generators Only (2G) 118 118
Lines Only (2L) 15 15
One Generator + One Line (1G+1L) 59 60
3
Generators Only (3G) 454 454
Lines Only (3L) 173 171
One Generator + Two Lines (1G+2L) 234 338
Two Generators + One Line (2G+1L) 427 436
Total 1483 1595
Once the minimal cut sets are identified, the corresponding reliability indices can be
determined, as discussed earlier. Table 3.2 presents a sample of minimal cut sets along with
their outage probabilities considering J1 objective only and the amount of load interrupted
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at the affected buses. The outage probability of a minimal cut set is denoted by p(C̄h).
For illustration, from Table 3.2, the third order minimal cut set {G3, G7, L10} only
affects bus 4 and 8; the real power load curtailment at these buses are 0.012 p.u and 0.016
p.u., respectively, which denote the LNSIs for this minimal cut set. The probability of
the event that components G3, G7 and L10 are on outage simultaneously, is determined
to be 5.27E-07. It should be noted that the minimal cut set {G3, G7, L10} is considered
a nodal minimal cut set for bus 4 and 8 only and not for other buses.




i=3 i=4 i=6 i=8 i=20
{G12, G31} 2.00E-03 0 0.405 0.624 0.317 0
{L2, L7} 8.77E-09 0.651 0 0 0 0
{G26, L11} 3.42E-06 0 0 0 0.136 0
{G1, G20, G29} 4.00E-05 0 0.169 0.008 0 0
{L2, L4, L14} 3.90E-12 0 0.115 0 0 0
{G31, L16, L17} 9.08E-12 0 0 0 0 0.113
{G3, G7, L10} 5.27E-07 0 0.012 0 0.016 0
Once the outage probabilities are obtained for each minimal cut set, the LOLPSys can
be determined using (2.7). In the IEEE RTS under study, the LOLPSys for year-10, prior
to installation of ERs, is found to be 0.5231 with both objective functions.
Computational Aspects
The considered test system is programmed and executed on a Dell PowerEdge R810 server,
in GAMS environment [74], Windows 64-bit operating system, with 4 Intel-Xeon 1.87 GHz
processors and 64 GB of RAM. The OPF is solved using the MINOS solver [74] which is
suitable for non-linear programming (NLP) problems. The model and solver statistics are
given in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3: Single OPF Solution Time for Different Outages
No. of Equations 239
No. of Variables 339
Component(s) Solution Time Component(s) Solution Time
on Outage seconds on Outage seconds
1G 0.369 3G 0.469
1L 0.361 3L 0.470
2G 0.458 1G + 2L 0.473
2L 0.460 2G + 1L 0.474
1G + 1L 0.464
Table 3.4 presents the total number of possible outage combinations, the number of
examined outage combinations, and the corresponding computing time for each cut set
order considering the single OPF solution times given in Table 3.3. For example in Table
3.4, the case of three generator outage (3G) may occur in 4960 possible combinations of
which only 457 combinations are examined after eliminating those cut sets which had one
or more generators as part of lower order minimal cut sets. From Table 3.3 it is noted that
the OPF with 3G outage requires 0.469 seconds of computing time, thus the total time
required for this case is 3 minutes and 34.33 seconds. From Table 3.4 it is noted that the
total time required to determine all minimal cut sets up to the third order, for the IEEE
RTS is 5 hours, 28 minutes and 31.03 seconds. Since this is a planning study, carried out
much in advance and does not affect the operational decisions, such computational times
are generally acceptable.
3.4.2 ER Siting and Sizing
Using K-Means Clustering Technique
After obtaining all the values of load not served at each bus because of outage of minimal cut
sets C̄h, LNSIC̄h,i, and their outage probabilities p(C̄h)i, the K-means clustering algorithm




, at terminal year of planning
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Table 3.4:
Computational Time for Determining the Reliability Indices
Cut Component(s) Total Number of Examined Computing
Set on Possible Outage Outage Time
Order Outage Combinations Combinations
1
1G 32 32 11.81 s
1L 38 38 13.72 s
2
2G 496 406 3 m 5.9 s
2L 703 703 5 m 23.38 s
1G+1L 1216 1102 8 m 31.33 s
3
3G 4960 457 3 m 34.33 s
3L 8436 8140 1 h 3 m 45.8 s
1G+2L 22496 19952 2 h 37 m 17.3 s
2G+1L 18848 10944 1 h 26 m 27.46 s
Total 57,225 41,774 5 h 28 m 31.03 s
(year-10) by initiating randomly chosen values of cluster means followed by measuring
the distance between a data point and its cluster mean; then assigning each point to the
cluster with the nearest mean and updating the mean until there is no further changes, as
discussed in Section 3.3, Step-1 to Step-7.





with J1 objective while 2132 data points with J2. Table 3.5 and 3.6 presents
the clusters obtained along with their means for the considered data set with J1 and J2,
respectively. The best result of 31 and 33 clusters with J1 and J2, respectively, are obtained
from multiple runs of different numbers of K.





are re-assigned to their original buses, e.g. with J1, bus-3









. . . , etc. This procedure is necessary to determine clusters within buses. As an example,




for bus-3. The next step is
to calculate EDNSa,i for each cluster at a bus using (3.13). For each bus, the highest
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Table 3.5: Clusters and their Means with J1 (K-Means)
Cluster Mean Cluster Mean Cluster Mean Cluster Mean
a mea a mea a mea a mea
(p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.)
y-coordinates y-coordinates y-coordinates y-coordinates
1 0.080114 9 0.252393 17 0.184263 25 0.035486
2 0.014614 10 3.33 18 0.128455 26 1.651769
3 0.005278 11 0.100806 19 3.17 27 0.373478
4 0.0485 12 0.171492 20 0.162506 28 0.054298
5 0.143074 13 1.00515 21 0.030593 29 0.086442
6 0.000591 14 0.569776 22 0.024432 30 0.0085
7 0.157269 15 0.21875 23 0.00241 31 0.072308
8 0.044594 16 0.211455 24 0.348667
Table 3.6: Clusters and their Means with J2 (K-Means)
Cluster Mean Cluster Mean Cluster Mean Cluster Mean
a mea a mea a mea a mea
(p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.)
y-coordinates y-coordinates y-coordinates y-coordinates
1 0.1743 10 0.212 19 0.042886 28 0.018
2 0.170415 11 0.012194 20 0.816917 29 0.02063
3 0.160916 12 0.074597 21 1.156346 30 0.000211
4 0.371685 13 0.062022 22 0.5456 31 0.184345
5 2.91 14 0.052422 23 0.000874 32 0.135642
6 0.005167 15 0.007 24 0.032556 33 0.096671
7 0.008 16 0.252796 25 0.083333
8 0.002364 17 1.7104 26 0.024679
9 0.015297 18 0.009143 27 0.027747
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EDNSa,i is obtained. Finally, a list of significant cluster’s EDNSa,i of all load buses in
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Figure 3.6. Clusters at bus-3 using K-means.
In Table 3.7, clusters with highest EDNSa,i at each bus are presented; and it is assumed
that any value of EDNSa,i less than 0.0005 p.u is rejected. It can be observed that optimal
ER locations are at buses 3, 4, 6, 8, 14, 20, 5, 9 and 7 with J1 objective, and at buses 4,
3, 6, 8, 14, 20, 5, 9 and 7 with J2 objective. The cluster means shown in Tables 3.5 and
3.6 for these selected clusters represents the ER size. A summary of the optimal siting
and sizing of ERs, arranged in decreasing order of EDNS, is presented in Table 3.8. The
ER sizes, as obtained from the K-means clustering technique are also noted in the table,
for a base of 100 MW. One important observation from these results is that the choice of
the objective function, J1 or J2, does not have any significant impact on the ER sizing or
siting; the optimal sizing and siting decisions with the different objectives are very close
to each other.
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Table 3.7: Clusters with Highest EDNSa,i at a Bus (K-Means)
J1 J2
Bus Cluster EDNSa,i Bus Cluster EDNSa,i
i a (p.u.) i a (p.u.)
3 14 0.1664 4 4 0.1315
4 24 0.1130 3 22 0.0866
6 14 0.0673 6 22 0.0619
8 15 0.0545 8 10 0.0551
14 24 0.0419 14 4 0.0419
20 24 0.0419 20 4 0.0419
5 4 0.0048 5 25 0.0048
9 9 0.0018 9 16 0.0019
7 11 0.0005 7 33 0.0005
1 16 EPS 13 5 EPS
2 17 EPS 18 17 EPS
19 26 EPS 1 10 EPS
18 10 EPS 2 31 EPS
15 19 EPS 19 17 EPS
16 13 EPS 15 5 EPS
10 16 EPS 10 17 EPS
*EPS: very small number
Table 3.8: Optimal Siting and Sizing of ERs in Order of EDNS (K-Means)
J1 J2
Location Size Location Size
(Bus) (MW ) (Bus) (MW )
3 56.98 4 37.17
4 34.87 3 54.56
6 56.98 6 54.56
8 21.88 8 21.20
14 34.87 14 37.17
20 34.87 20 37.17
5 4.85 5 8.33
9 25.24 9 25.28
7 10.08 7 9.67
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Using Fuzzy C-Means Clustering Technique
The same exercise is repeated considering the algorithm presented in the Fuzzy C-means





in the Fuzzy C-means is assigned to the cluster with the highest degree of membership,
as discussed in Section 3.3.2, Step-1 to Step-6. Table 3.9 and 3.10 presents the clusters
obtained along with their means for the considered data set with J1 and J2, respectively.
Step-8 to Step-12 are then carried out from the K-means clustering algorithm, discussed
earlier, to re-assign the data points to their original buses to determine clusters within
buses and to calculate EDNSa,i for each cluster.
Table 3.9: Clusters and their Means with J1 (Fuzzy C-Means)
Cluster Mean Cluster Mean Cluster Mean Cluster Mean
a mea a mea a mea a mea
(p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.)
y-coordinates y-coordinates y-coordinates y-coordinates
1 0.097582 9 0.30385 17 0.431666 25 0.230178
2 0.714782 10 0.073315 18 0.014341 26 0.181254
3 1.87251 11 0.239311 19 0.586471 27 0.171585
4 0.359726 12 0.141913 20 0.043758 28 0.161941
5 1.000265 13 0.404328 21 0.5114 29 0.202483
6 0.211279 14 0.003351 22 0.27871 30 0.330128
7 0.028165 15 0.085065 23 0.148604 31 0.112789
8 1.533465 16 0.130362 24 0.054797
In Table 3.11, a list of significant cluster’s EDNSa,i of all load buses in the RTS is
presented. Table 3.12 presents the results of the optimal siting and sizing of ERs and it is
noted that irrespective of the choice of J1 and J2 the results are very similar. Furthermore,
it is noted from the results that the optimal size, site and year of installation of the ERs
are very close to each other, and the choice of either K-Means or Fuzzy C-Means clustering
technique has little impact on the ER selections.
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Table 3.10: Clusters and their Means with J2 (Fuzzy C-Means)
Cluster Mean Cluster Mean Cluster Mean Cluster Mean
a mea a mea a mea a mea
(p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.)
y-coordinates y-coordinates y-coordinates y-coordinates
1 1.854702 10 0.239153 19 0.319092 28 0.073313
2 0.042614 11 0.097654 20 0.085274 29 0.161708
3 0.363865 12 0.203279 21 0.054268 30 0.02808
4 0.229292 13 0.130727 22 0.190865 31 0.419024
5 0.721446 14 0.63021 23 1.307943 32 0.211272
6 0.145245 15 0.180227 24 0.52684 33 0.003474
7 0.275155 16 0.334277 25 0.905804
8 0.29552 17 0.171397 26 0.014641
9 1.120767 18 0.4945 27 0.112557
Table 3.11: Clusters with Highest EDNSa,i at a Bus (Fuzzy C-Means)
J1 J2
Bus Cluster EDNSa,i Bus Cluster EDNSa,i
i a (p.u.) i a (p.u.)
3 2 0.1664 3 5 0.0866
4 30 0.0854 4 16 0.0844
6 19 0.0587 8 4 0.0550
8 25 0.0549 6 14 0.0544
14 4 0.0419 14 3 0.0419
20 4 0.0419 20 3 0.0419
5 24 0.0054 5 21 0.0054
9 11 0.0018 9 10 0.0019
7 31 0.0005 7 27 0.0005
1 29 EPS 13 1 EPS
2 29 EPS 18 1 EPS
19 3 EPS 1 12 EPS
18 3 EPS 2 22 EPS
15 3 EPS 19 1 EPS
16 5 EPS 15 1 EPS
10 6 EPS 10 1 EPS
*EPS: very small number
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Table 3.12: Optimal Siting and Sizing of ERs in Order of EDNS (Fuzzy
C-Means)
J1 J2
Location Size Location Size
(Bus) (MW ) (Bus) (MW )
3 71.48 3 72.14
4 33.01 4 33.43
6 58.65 8 22.93
8 23.02 6 63.02
14 35.97 14 36.39
20 35.97 20 36.39
5 5.48 5 5.43
9 23.93 9 23.92
7 11.28 7 11.26
3.4.3 Validation of Optimal ERs
In this validation exercise, nine ERs at the selected buses- 3, 4, 6, 8, 14, 20, 5, 9 and 7 are
added to the system with their corresponding sizes as given in Table 3.8. It is assumed that
the failure and repair rate of an ER are 0.005 per hour and 0.05 per hour, respectively. The
unavailability of each ER is calculated using (2.16). The active and reactive power balance
equations (3.3) and (3.4), respectively, are modified to include the power supplied by an
ER at a bus (PERi and QERi), and are optimization variables. The OPF model given by
(3.1) - (3.10) now includes additional inequality constraints on active and reactive power
generation limits of the ERs (PMinERi , P
Max
ERi




The impact of the presence of ERs is observed in the formation of new combinations of
minimal cut sets. Some of these new cut sets were previously of lower order, and have now
changed to a higher order cut set and no longer leads to an interruption. For example, a
simultaneous outage of {G1, G20, G29} does not cause a system failure anymore, because
the cut set has changed from the third order to a higher order. These changes improve the
system reliability since, when the cut set order increases, its unavailability reduces.
54
3.4.4 Optimal Year of Commissioning of ERs
Table 3.13 presents the optimal year of commissioning of the ERs, obtained using the
proposed schematic of Fig. 3.4. The desired reliability target for the system (LOLPtarg)
is set at 0.1562, which is the specified reliability level of the RTS at year-0. As the system
load increases over the plan horizon, the LOLP will increase beyond the system target
level. ERs are commissioned at those specific years when the LOLP is above the target
level, in the order of EDNS as given in Table 3.8 and Table 3.12 so as to bring the LOLP
below the system target level. This sequential process of addition of ERs is shown in Fig.
3.7. For the sake of brevity, this analysis is carried out with optimal ERs obtained from
the K-means clustering technique only, however the approach is generic. It is noted that
the year of installation is very similar for J1 and J2 except for one year.
Table 3.13: Optimal Year of Commissioning of ERs
Year
J1 J2
ER @Bus Size (MW) ER @Bus Size (MW)
0 - - - -
1 3 56.98 4 37.17
2 - - 3 54.56
3 4 34.87 - -
4 6 56.98 6 54.56
5 - - - -
6 8 21.88 8 21.20
7 14 34.87 14 37.17
8 20 34.87 20 37.17
9 5, 9 4.85 + 25.24 = 30.09 5, 9 8.33 + 25.28 = 33.61
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Figure 3.7. Optimal year of commissioning of ERs, siting and sizing determined by
K-means clustering.
3.5 Some Important Comments
3.5.1 Effect of Cut Set Levels
As discussed earlier, once the outage probabilities of each minimal cut set are determined,
the LOLPSys can be obtained using (2.7). It can be noted from Table 3.14 that LOLPSys,
for year-10 in the presence of ERs, converges to an equilibrium value with third order
minimal cut sets. Beyond third order, the LOLPSys does not change significantly but the
computational burden can be very high. Therefore, in this work all analysis is carried out
considering first, second and third order minimal cut sets only.
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3.5.2 Impact of Wind-Based ERs on Reliability
In this part of the study, it is assumed that generators G24 and G25, at bus 22 of the RTS
are wind generators of 50 MW capacity, each. Furthermore, each wind-based ER is assumed
to have an FOR of 0.5, as per [75]. In Table 3.15, the probability of outage corresponding
to each cut set order and group are shown. Because of the high value of FOR of wind-based
ERs, ranging from 0.5 to 0.8 [75], it is noted that LOLPSys increases significantly when
there are wind-based ERs in the system because of intermittent availability of wind. The
LOLPSys, at year-0, was 0.1562 when only conventional generators are considered, while
it is significantly increased to 0.2158 in the presence of wind-based ERs. The optimal
siting, sizing and year of installation of ERs will also be affected consequently, although
these have not been explicitly demonstrated in the studies presented, to limit the scope of
discussions. This can considered as a future research issue.
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Table 3.15: Comparison of System Reliability Considering Wind-Based ER
(Year-0)
Cut Component(s) No Wind-Based ER With Wind-Based ER
Set on Number of Probability Number of Probability
Order Outage Minimal of Minimal of
Cut Sets Outage Cut Sets Outage
1
1G - - - -
1L - - - -
2
2G 20 0.12 20 0.12
2L 8 2.02E-6 8 2.02E-6
1G + 1L 3 0.00011 3 0.00011
3
3G 327 0.03598 327 0.09557
3L 67 7.60E-9 67 7.60E-9
1G + 2L 54 6.83E-7 54 6.83E-7
2G + 1L 106 0.00012 106 0.00012
585 LOLPSys = 0.1562 585 LOLPSys = 0.2158
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3.5.3 Some Comments on the Clustering Techniques
It should be noted that due to the sensitivity of the clustering techniques to the initial




are aggregated at the beginning
to ensure that a given cluster has the same mean across all buses. There is no general
theoretical approach to find the optimal number of clusters; some researchers argue that it
is beyond the scope of the theory of clustering algorithm [76, 77]. Researchers have either
applied a simulation based approach where multiple runs considering different number of
clusters are used to find the most suitable number, or some others have used a simple rule
of thumb to set the number of clusters, where, Number of Clusters =
√
(n/2), and n is the
number of data points [78]. In this work, we have used the rule of thumb to determine the
number of clusters. Furthermore, in the literature, some kind of indices referred to as the
cluster validity indices have been reported which compare different clustering techniques
and yield the best alternative [79]. However, these indices are not examined in this chapter
and can be considered for future research.
3.6 Summary
This chapter presented a reliability analysis based framework for a composite power system
to identify the optimal site, size and year of installation of ERs. The optimal size and sites
for ERs were determined using the novel application of K-means clustering and Fuzzy
C-means clustering of the bus-wise LNSI indices. A novel, OPF based approach was
used to compute the system minimal cut sets and hence the LNSI indices; and in the
OPF, two different objectives were considered to examine the differences on LNSI indices.
Thereafter, over a plan period of N years, a novel adequacy check algorithm, which starts
from the plan terminal year and ends at the first year and hence determines the optimal
year of commissioning of the ERs, was developed. This work simultaneously determined
optimal size, site and year of installation of ERs using a reliability based criterion. Network
constraints were imposed to guarantee acceptable reliability level. Results showed the
improvements and the positive impact of the ERs on system reliability.
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Chapter 4
Identification of Critical Components
of Composite Power Systems Using
System-Wide Minimal Cut Sets‡
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an OPF based method to determine the minimal cut sets of a compos-
ite power system and hence identify the critical components. In composite power systems,
it is necessary to identify which components are more critical than others from a reliability
stand point. For example, if the impact of outage of component ’a’ is higher than that of
component ’b’, component ’a’ has a higher ”criticality index” than ’b’, where the impact
of outage is measured in terms of a given reliability index. Detecting critical components
of the power system can help planners to make economic decisions on new investments
in generation capacities and transmission lines upgrades, can help operators to ensure
maintaining the delivery of electricity during system failure and disturbance events. The
Parts of this chapter have been published in: B. Lami and K. Bhattacharya, Identification of critical
components of composite power systems using minimal cut sets, in Proc. of Innovative Smart Grid
Technologies (ISGT) Conference, 2015, Washington D.C., USA, pp.1-5, Feb. 2015.
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method presented provides important information on system planning, operation, mainte-
nance and upgrades by ranking critical components of a composite power system. Each
component is ranked based on minimal cut set outage probability and the consequent loss
of load arising from outages of components belonging to a minimal cut set.
4.2 Determination of System Minimal Cut Sets
The concept of minimal cut sets can be used in the reliability and risk calculations for
the system as a whole. The outage states of generators, transmission lines, or both, are
considered within the OPF model to determine these cut sets. The algorithm to determine
the minimal cut sets of a composite power system, up to the preset order, is shown in
Fig. 4.1. The same objective function (3.2) to minimize the total load curtailment and its
constraints, discussed in Chapter 3, Section 2, is used here. The step-wise procedure to
determine the system minimal cut sets is as follows:
 Step-1: Select a cut set of first order, i.e., each generator or each line is considered
individually as a first order cut set.
 Step-2: Execute the OPF with this cut set on an outage.
 Step-3: If there is a loss of load at any bus (∆PdUNMi 6= 0), then this cut set is a
first-order minimal cut set for the whole system. Then,
1. Calculate the probability of failure of this minimal cut set, p(C̄h), using (2.6).
2. Report the system LNSI.
If there is no loss of load at any bus, then go to Step-2 with a new first-order cut set and
check for loss of load at a bus. Continue until all first order cut sets are considered to
be ”on outage”, and hence form lists of first-order system and nodal minimal cut sets.
 Step-4: Select a second order cut set, i.e., a combination of two elements, which may be
a generator-generator, generator-line, or line-line pair. Carry out Step-2 and Step-3 to
determine the complete lists of second-order system minimal cut sets.
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 Step-5: Continue Step-1 to Step-4 to determine higher-order combinations of outages of
system components.
 
Choose a combination of M-order of 
system components
Run OPF with M component(s) being unavailable 
simultaneously
No
Ignore the M-order 
combination
No
Report the M-order combination as 














Is there loss of 
load at any 
bus?




Figure 4.1: Schematic for determining system minimal cut sets.
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4.3 Identifying Critical Components
Power systems comprise many types of components, such as transformers, lines, cables,
generators, and loads that enable the system to function in a desired manner. The system
is often subjected to abnormal effects, such as weather conditions, animals, human error,
overload, and ageing that can cause failure of a component. Therefore, it is important in
reliability assessment to identify components that can affect system safety.
The flow-chart of the proposed method to identify the critical components of a com-
posite power system is described in Fig 4.2. The step-wise algorithm proceeds as follows:
 Step-1: Determine all minimal cut sets of the system, (C̄h), as presented in Section 3.2,
denoted as set {Z}.
 Step-2: Identify all minimal cut sets associated with cm, (C̄h)cm, denoted as set {Xcm}.
 Step-3: Choose a minimal cut set (C̄h)cm, ∀ (C̄h)cm ∈ {Xcm} associated with component
cm and execute the OPF with all elements of (C̄h)cm on outage.
 Step-4: Calculate the probability of failure of this minimal cut set, p(C̄h)tcm, by mul-
tiplying the probability of failure of each individual component, using (2.3) and (2.4),
that construct this minimal cut set.
 Step-5: Estimate LNSIC̄h,cm associated with this minimal cut set.
 Step-6: Check for all minimal cut sets associated with cm by repeating Step-3 to Step-5.







 Step-8: Report frequency of occurrence of cm, fcm, in {Z}.
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The applied concept considers component cm is a trigger of an event if it is the last
component, on a minimal cut set, to fail [28], e.g. consider the third order minimal cut set
{G3, G7, L6} where the sequence of component outages is G3 followed by G7 then L6; the





Determine all minimum cut sets of the system, 
set {Z} as per Fig. 4.1
Choose a minimal cut set from {Xcm} and run OPF 
considering outage of the associated components
cm = 1
         Estimate                    associated with this 
minimal cut set
Calculate probability of failure of this minimal 
cut set, 
Yes
All minimal cut 
sets in {Xcm} 
checked? 








Identify all minimal cut sets associated with cm, 
set {Xcm}
𝐶𝑅𝑐𝑚







𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝐶 ℎ ,𝑐𝑚  
Figure 4.2: Schematic for determining critical components.
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4.4 Case Studies: Analysis and Results
Studies are performed on two test case power systems, the 6-bus RBTS [80] shown in Fig.
4.3 and the 24-bus IEEE RTS [73] shown in Fig. 3.5 in Chapter-3. The proposed algorithm
is programmed and executed in the GAMS environment [74]. In the RBTS there are 11
generators ranging from 5 MW to 40 MW in capacity, 6 buses, and 9 transmission lines.
The system has an annual peak load of 185 MW, and the installed generation capacity is
240 MW. The transmission network voltage level is 230 kV. All per unit quantities refer to
active power (MW), reactive power (Mvar) or complex power (MVA) with a base of 100
MVA. Relevant data of the RBTS is given in Appendix B.
G6 G7 G8 G9 G10 G11
BUS 2
G5












40 MW  40 MW   10 MW   20 MW






Figure 4.3: Roy Billinton Test System [80].
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4.4.1 System Reliability and Risk Evaluation
A. RBTS
The system minimal cut sets are identified by using the method discussed in Section 3.2,
and the results are presented in Table 4.1. The minimal cut sets are determined up to the
third-order, in this research, to keep the computational burden within reasonable limits,
and without any loss of generality.
The first-order minimal cut sets are determined considering a single component outage
at a time, either a generator or a transmission line. For each outage case, if there is loss
of load at a bus, the particular component on outage, becomes a first-order minimal cut
set. As observed from Table 4.1, there is only one first-order minimal cut set in the RBTS
which is line L9.
The second-order minimal cut sets are determined considering the simultaneous outage
of two components of the system, i.e. two generators, two transmission lines, or one gen-
erator and one transmission line. For each outage case, if there is loss of load at a bus, the
two components on simultaneous outage form a second-order minimal cut set, if neither of
them is a first-order minimal cut set.
In Table 4.1, it is seen that there are 20 second-order minimal cut sets where both
components are generators, 2 minimal cut sets where both components are transmission
lines, and none second-order minimal cut sets of generator-line pairing. In the same way,
the third-order minimal cut sets for the RBTS are also determined, and shown in Table
4.1.
In Table 4.2, the system reliability and operational risk corresponding to each cut set
order and group are shown, where p(C̄h)
∞ denote the steady-state probability of the outage
of all minimal cut sets of a given order while p(C̄h)
10 is the system outage probabiltiy at
time T=10 hrs, considering outage of all minimal cut sets of that order, obtained from
(2.7). It can be seen from the table that the probability of failures progressively become
low up to the third order so there is no need to test higher orders of minimal cut sets.
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Table 4.1: System Minimal Cut Sets for RBTS
Cut Set
Order





















1 Gen, 2 Lines {G1,L2,L7},{G2,L2,L7}
2 Gens, 1 Line {G3,G7,L1},{G3,G7,L6}
Table 4.2: System Reliability and Operational Risk for RBTS




1 Generator - -
1 Line 0.0011400 0.0007213
2
2 Generators 0.0100506 0.0003586
2 Lines 4.222E-06 1.690E-06
1 Generator, 1 Line - -
3
3 Generators 5.440E-05 3.070E-07
3 Lines 2.770E-07 7.060E-08
1 Generator, 2 Lines 1.926E-06 1.586E-07
2 Generators, 1 Line 1.386E-06 2.784E-08




Once the unavailabilities are obtained for each minimal cut set group, the system re-
liability and risk can be determined using (2.7). In the RBTS under study, the system
reliability is found to be 0.0112529. The operational risk for a lead-time of 10 hours after
the event, assuming that the system loads remain the same during this period is obtained
to be 0.0010822. The same set of minimal cut sets are used for this purpose.
B. IEEE RTS
The same exercise is repeated for the IEEE RTS. In Table 4.3, it is seen that there is no
first-order minimal cut set. There are 20 second-order minimal cut sets where both compo-
nents are generators, 8 minimal cut sets where both components are transmission lines, and
3 second-order minimal cut sets of generator-line pairing. In the same way, the third-order
minimal cut sets are also determined to be 327, 80, 54 and 106 when the three components
on outage simultaneously are generators, transmission lines, one-generator-two-lines triad,
and two-generator-one-line triad, respectively.
The system reliability and risk calculation are carried out for the IEEE RTS. The min-
imal cut set groups along with their corresponding outage probabilities at the steady-state
and the lead-time of 10 hours after the event are determined to 0.1562166 and 0.001755074,
respectively, as presented in Table 4.4.
4.4.2 Determining Critical Components
A. RBTS
Ranking calculations are performed on two component types, generators and lines. By
using the procedure described in Section 4.2 and Fig. 4.2 on component G1 for the steady-
state condition, the first row in Table 4.5 shows the complete list of the system minimal
cut sets {Z}. The next row shows the set {XG1} of minimal cut sets associated with
component G1. For each of these minimal cut sets, p(C̄h)
∞
G1 and LNSIC̄h,G1 are calculated.
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Table 4.3: System Minimal Cut Sets for IEEE RTS
Cut Set
Order
Cut Set Groups Minimal Cut Sets {Z}
1
Generator Only (1G) None
























{L4,L5,L26},. . . . . . ,{L25,L26,L28},{L29,L34,L35},{L29,L36,L37}





. . . . . . ,{GE32,L23,L29},{GE32,L24,L28},{GE32,L31,L38}






. . . . . . ,{GE31,GE32,L30},GE {GE31,GE32,L31},{GE31,GE32,L38}
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Table 4.4: System Reliability and Operational Risk for IEEE RTS




1 Generator - -
1 Line - -
2
2 Generators 0.12 0.00159648
2 Lines EPS EPS
1 Generator, 1 Line 0.00010955 EPS
3
3 Generators 0.035981 0.000150549
3 Lines EPS EPS
1 Generator, 2 Lines EPS EPS
2 Generators, 1 Line 0.000123312 EPS
System LOLP (p∞sys) & Operational Risk (p
10
sys) 0.1562166 0.001755074
*EPS: very small number
The criticality index for G1, CR∞G1, is found to be 6.58E-04, applying (4.1). The same
exercise is repeated for all components at steady-state and T=10 hrs, and the criticality
indices are determined for each component under study. Calculations are carried out on
components if a single, double or triple outage occurs.
The list of system components are now ranked by Criticality Index as presented in
Table 4.6. It can be observed from Fig. 4.3 that bus-6 is located far from the generation
units and is connected to the system by a single line (L9). Although L9 seems to be the
most critical component because of its location and its outage will cause a system failure,
it is fourth in the ranking, under steady state condition, for its lower failure rate, which
means L9 less likely to fail as compared to G1. However, the likelihood of failure during
operation can increase, and can change the criticality of a component. As observed in
Table 4.7, the rank of L9 jumps from fourth to first place.
G1 and G2 are considered the most critical components in the system because of their
reliability characteristics, capacities and locations followed by G7 which has the same
failure rate and capacity as G1 and G2 but less critical location.
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∀ C̄h ∈ {XG1} ∀ C̄h ∈ {XG1} (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.)
{G2, G1} 0.000894 0.292 2.6105E-04
6.58E-04
{G3, G1} 0.000602 0.0009 5.4180E-07
{G4, G1} 0.0007488 0.097 7.2634E-05
{G7, G1} 0.000602 0.276 1.6615E-04
{G8, G1} 0.0004439 0.089 3.9507E-05
{G9, G1} 0.0004439 0.089 3.9507E-05
{G10, G1} 0.0004439 0.089 3.9507E-05
{G11, G1} 0.0004439 0.089 3.9507E-05
{L2,L7, G1} 9.631E-07 0.038 3.6598E-08
B. IEEE RTS
The same exercise is repeated for the IEEE RTS considering the step-wise procedure for
determining the critical components discussed in Section 4.2. Table 4.8, presents the
procedures performed on G1. There 10 minimal cut sets associated with component G1
{XG1}. For each of these minimal cut sets, p(C̄h)∞G1 and LNSIC̄h,G1 are and hence the
criticality index for G1, CR∞G1, is found to be 0.0004655. The same exercise is repeated for
all components at steady-state and T=10 hrs, and the criticality indices are obtained for
each component under study.
The list of ranked components at steady-state and lead-time of 10 hours are presented
in Tables 4.9 and 4.10, respectively. It can be observed from Fig. 3.5 that G22 and G23 are
the most critical components in the system because of their capacity sizes and reliability
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Table 4.6: Ranking of Components by Criticality Index at t =∞, RBTS
cm fcm CR
∞
cm Rank cm fcm CR
∞
cm Rank
G1 9 6.58E-04 1 G3 6 1.37E-06 11
G2 9 6.58E-04 2 L6 3 7.16E-07 12
G7 11 4.70E-04 3 L8 2 5.21E-07 13
L9 1 2.28E-04 4 L5 3 5.21E-07 14
G4 9 1.90E-04 5 L7 6 1.63E-07 15
G8 9 1.05E-04 6 G5 1 1.40E-07 16
G9 9 1.05E-04 7 G6 1 1.40E-07 17
G10 9 1.05E-04 8 L2 6 1.27E-07 18
G11 9 1.05E-04 9 L3 2 8.41E-08 19
L1 3 2.42E-05 10 L4 3 1.88E-09 20
Table 4.7: Ranking of Components by Criticality Index at t = 10 hr, RBTS
cm fcm CR
10
cm Rank cm fcm CR
10
cm Rank
L9 1 0.00072 1 L6 3 2.9E-07 11
G1 9 2.5E-05 2 L5 3 2.8E-07 12
G2 9 2.5E-05 3 L8 2 2.1E-07 13
G7 11 1.4E-05 4 G3 6 4.7E-08 14
G4 9 7.4E-06 5 L7 6 2.9E-08 15
G8 9 3.4E-06 6 L2 6 2.6E-08 16
G9 9 3.4E-06 7 L3 2 2.1E-08 17
G10 9 3.4E-06 8 G5 1 8.9E-10 18
G11 9 3.4E-06 9 G6 1 8.9E-10 19
L1 3 6.3E-07 10 L4 3 4.8E-10 20
72
characteristics, followed by G32 which has a higher failure rate but less capacity.
It can observed from Fig.3.5 that although bus-7 is only connected to the system by
line L11; the ranking of L11 is still twenty-second, which is not a very critical component
in the system. The reason being the presence of three large generators with relatively low
demand at the bus, and the low outage rate of L11. However, the likelihood of failure can
increase at the operational stage and can change the criticality of a component.














. . . . . . ,{GE31,GE32,L30},{GE31,GE32,L31},{GE31,GE32,L38}
Set {Xcm} {G1,G9,G22},{G1,G10,G22},{G1,G10,G22},{G1,G10,G23},{G1,G11,G22},








∀ C̄h ∈ {XG1} ∀ C̄h ∈ {XG1} (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.)
{G9,G22,G1} 0.00048 0.09505 0.000045624
0.0004655
{G9,G23,G1} 0.00048 0.07604 0.000036499
{G10,G22,G1} 0.00048 0.07604 0.000036499
{G10,G23,G1} 0.00048 0.09505 0.000045624
{G11,G22,G1} 0.00048 0.09505 0.000045624
{G11,G23,G1} 0.00048 0.07604 0.000036499
{G20,G32,G1} 0.00032 0.157 0.00005024
{G21,G32,G1} 0.00032 0.163 0.00005216
{G30,G32,G1} 0.00032 0.182 0.00005824
{G31,G32,G1} 0.00032 0.182 0.00005824
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Table 4.9: Ranking List of Components Importance at t =∞, IEEE RTS
cm fcm CR
∞
cm Rank cm fcm CR
∞
cm Rank cm fcm CR
∞
cm Rank cm fcm CR
∞
cm Rank
G22 100 0.088003 1 G2 10 0.000466 19 L19 3 EPS 37 L36 1 EPS 55
G23 100 0.086602 2 G5 10 0.000466 20 L8 2 EPS 38 L34 1 EPS 56
G32 121 0.049186 3 G6 10 0.000466 21 L4 22 EPS 39 L16 22 EPS 57
G12 18 0.012247 4 L11 9 5.87E-05 22 L13 14 EPS 40 L17 19 EPS 58
G13 18 0.012247 5 G24 18 5.57E-05 23 L9 9 EPS 41 L14 9 EPS 59
G14 18 0.012126 6 G25 18 5.57E-05 24 L3 4 EPS 42 L15 8 EPS 60
G20 39 0.005689 7 G26 18 5.57E-05 25 L2 3 EPS 43 L28 4 EPS 61
G21 39 0.005667 8 G27 18 5.57E-05 26 L27 22 EPS 44 L18 1 EPS 62
G30 39 0.005377 9 G28 18 5.57E-05 27 L7 22 EPS 45 L20 1 EPS 63
G31 39 0.005369 10 G29 18 5.57E-05 28 L12 2 EPS 46 L35 1 EPS 64
G9 53 0.002383 11 G15 10 2.93E-05 29 L6 15 EPS 47 L37 1 EPS 65
G10 53 0.002383 12 G16 10 2.93E-05 30 L24 3 EPS 48 L30 0 0 66
G11 53 0.002365 13 G17 10 2.93E-05 31 L1 7 EPS 49 L31 0 0 67
G7 34 0.000768 14 G18 10 2.93E-05 32 L29 7 EPS 50 L32 0 0 68
G8 34 0.000768 15 G19 10 2.93E-05 33 L21 2 EPS 51 L33 0 0 69
G3 34 0.000767 16 L5 26 EPS 34 L22 2 EPS 52 L38 0 0 70
G4 34 0.000767 17 L10 8 EPS 35 L25 2 EPS 53
G1 10 0.000466 18 L23 5 EPS 36 L26 2 EPS 54
*EPS: very small number
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Table 4.10: Ranking List of Components Importance at t = 10, IEEE RTS
cm fcm CR
∞
cm Rank cm fcm CR
∞
cm Rank cm fcm CR
∞
cm Rank cm fcm CR
∞
cm Rank
G22 100 0.000745 1 G1 10 1.71E-06 19 G19 10 EPS 37 L34 1 EPS 55
G23 100 0.000727 2 G2 10 1.71E-06 20 L4 22 EPS 38 L1 7 EPS 56
G32 121 0.000429 3 G5 10 1.71E-06 21 L8 2 EPS 39 L16 22 EPS 57
G12 18 0.000176 4 G6 10 1.71E-06 22 L13 14 EPS 40 L17 19 EPS 58
G13 18 0.000176 5 G24 18 EPS 23 L9 9 EPS 41 L14 9 EPS 59
G14 18 0.000175 6 G25 18 EPS 24 L3 4 EPS 42 L15 8 EPS 60
G20 39 7.88E-05 7 G26 18 EPS 25 L2 3 EPS 43 L28 4 EPS 61
G21 39 7.83E-05 8 G27 18 EPS 26 L27 22 EPS 44 L18 1 EPS 62
G30 39 7.28E-05 9 G28 18 EPS 27 L7 22 EPS 45 L20 1 EPS 63
G31 39 7.27E-05 10 G29 18 EPS 28 L12 2 EPS 46 L35 1 EPS 64
G9 53 8.21E-06 11 L23 5 EPS 29 L24 3 EPS 47 L37 1 EPS 65
G10 53 8.21E-06 12 L19 3 EPS 30 L6 15 EPS 48 L30 0 0 66
G11 53 8.09E-06 13 L5 26 EPS 31 L29 7 EPS 49 L31 0 0 67
G7 34 3.07E-06 14 L10 8 EPS 32 L21 2 EPS 50 L32 0 0 68
G8 34 3.07E-06 15 G15 10 EPS 33 L22 2 EPS 51 L33 0 0 69
G3 34 3.07E-06 16 G16 10 EPS 34 L25 2 EPS 52 L38 0 0 70
G4 34 3.07E-06 17 G17 10 EPS 35 L26 2 EPS 53
L11 9 2.87E-06 18 G18 10 EPS 36 L36 1 EPS 54
*EPS: very small number
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4.5 Validation of Components’ Criticality
In this validation exercise, carried out on the IEEE RTS at the steady-state condition, four
components G22, G13, G31 and L11 are arbitrary selected. The OPF is executed with one
of these components on outage at a time. The nodal and system LOLP is then calculated
and compared to the base case with no component on outage. It can be observed from Fig.
4.4 and Table 4.11, that the novel OPF based procedure proposed to compute the nodal
and system minimal cut sets for composite power systems, not only provides information
on system and nodal reliability and risk indices, but in the process, can also give a sense
of identifying of critical components and rank their importance in the system without the




















Figure 4.4: Nodal LOLP at Different Outages for IEEE RTS at t =∞.
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Table 4.11: Ranking List of Components Importance at t =∞, IEEE RTS
LOLP
Bus
Base G22 out G13 out G31 out L11 out
3 0.087241 0.577139 0.240016 0.143444 6.87E-06
4 0.094343 0.286786 0.350166 0.187727 7.14E-07
5 0.001601 0.002767 0.00024 0.013389 1.46E-07
6 0.068153 0.150971 0.338983 0.060883 1.36E-06
7 0.001608 0.0048 0.001318 0.001751 0.0048
8 0.034262 0.126447 0.021162 0.046394 0.358526
9 0.000128 7.36E-05 1.18E-07 0.015741 3.62E-08
10 0 0.000105 1.06E-08 0.000637 2.99E-13
13 0.000125 0.002954 0.0025 0.006191 0
14 0.066775 0.788178 0.120008 0.144579 0.000128
15 0.0144 0.244473 0 0 0
16 0 0.018122 0 6.40E-05 0
18 0.014403 0.28192 0 5.18E-05 0
19 0.009603 0.174989 2.75E-10 0.000524 1.75E-10
20 0.000128 0.022687 2.27E-08 0.004984 7.77E-11
System 0.15621282 0.979131 0.359964 0.312021 0.242223
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4.6 Summary
In this chapter, the concept of minimal cut sets was applied to identify critical components
in the composite power system. The proposed method, applied to the 6-bus RBTS and
the 24-bus IEEE RTS involved solving an appropriate OPF to obtain the system minimal
cut sets under outage condition of generators, transmission lines, or both. Once the com-
ponent unavailabilities were calculated using failure and repair rate data, the minimal cut
set probabilities were determined, which were then used to evaluate component Criticality
Indices. The proposed method provided a ranking of components’ criticality and this infor-
mation is important in decision making pertaining to maintenance scheduling, generator
investments and line upgrading.
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Chapter 5
Impact of EV Charging Loads and
Demand Response on Composite
Reliability Assessment and Critical
Component Identification‡
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a reliability assessment framework for composite power systems
taking into account both uncontrolled and smart charging PEV loads as well as DR options
and determines the minimal cut sets for the system. Various combinations of shares of
uncontrolled and smart charging PEVs are examined to determine the system adequacy
indices. Furthermore, this is extended to include the identification of critical components
Parts of this chapter have been submitted as a paper for review in: B. Lami, A. B. Humayd and
K. Bhattacharya, “Impact of EV Charging Loads and DR on Composite System Reliability and Critical
Component Identification,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.
*An earlier versions of this work was published in: B. Lami, A. B. Humayd and K. Bhattacharya,
“Adequacy Assessment of Power Systems with PEV Charging Loads Considering Customer Behaviour,”
in Proc. of IEEE PES General Meeting, Boston, MA, USA, pp. 1-5, July. 2016.
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of the system in the presence of PEV loads and DR.
5.2 System Models Including PEV Loads and DR for
Reliability Assessment
5.2.1 Uncontrolled PEV Charging Load Model
Using driver behaviour, vehicle type and charging level information, the uncontrolled PEV
charging load profiles at each bus can be developed and added to the nominal load profile,
for use in the reliability model.
First, the probability density functions (pdf) of PEV driving pattern parameters,
namely daily mileage driven and home arrival times are extracted using the NHTS data [38].
Thereafter, the SOC and the charging duration, TD, of each vehicle in the fleet is calcu-
lated from the mileage driven data (Dkm), generated using the pdf of the daily mileage, the
driving range in the electrical mode (AER), the SOCmin and depth of discharge (DOD)
of the vehicle as follows:
SOC =
SOCmin + (1− D
km
AER
)DOD Dkm ≤ AER,
SOCmin Dkm > AER.
(5.1)
TD for each vehicle in the fleet is estimated from the power drawn at a given charging






The starting time of charging can be modelled considering two realistic scenarios to
mimic the behaviour of PEV customers, and hence assess the impact of the charging load,
arising there from, on system reliability, as discussed below:
 Arrive and Plug (A&P) - it is assumed that customers will start charging their
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vehicles immediately after the last trip to home.
 Time of Use (TOU) Price Based - the PEV drivers are assumed to respond to TOU
price, starting to change at the onset of the off-peak price at 7 PM. The starting
time of charging follows a Poisson distribution where the charging delay, γ, obtained
considering Ontario TOU price. For example, for on-peak arrivals, γ is the wait time
from their arrival to the onset of off-peak TOU price, while for off-peak arrivals, γ =
0.1 hour.
Finally, the uncontrolled charging profile can be constructed using determined parameters,
i.e. charging duration and starting time of charging, for each vehicle in the fleet.
5.2.2 Smart-OPF Considering PEVs and DR







subject to the following constraints:
1. Active and Reactive Power Balance: is ensured by the power flow equations, which
include PdUNM and QdUNM , the real and reactive power load curtailment variables,
respectively, that may arise from the outages of various components.











|Vi,hr||Vj,hr||Yij|cos(θij,hr + δj,hr − δi,hr), (5.4)
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QdUNMi,hr is the relief in reactive power associated with Pd
UNM
i,hr , and depends on the load
power factors pf [81].
2. Smart Charging Constraints : These constraints ensure that the total energy required
by PEVs of class c is equal to the daily charging energy drawn from the grid and that
the maximum power drawn by PEVs is specified by the charging level.
24∑
hr=1
PEV Si,hr,c,cl = βN
EV
i,c,clEc ∀ i, c, cl, (5.7)
PEV Si,hr,c,cl ≤ βNEVi,c,clPcl ∀ i, hr, c, cl, (5.8)
3. DR Constraints : Theses constrains ensure the maximum and minimum allowable de-







∆PDUPi,hr ≤ BUP .Pdi,hr, (5.10)
∆PDDNi,hr ≤ BDN .Pdi,hr. (5.11)
Balancing the demand variations during the day from shifting to another day is defined
by (5.9). Equations (5.10) and (5.11) are the maximum shiftable demand variation
upward and downward.
4. Limits on Load Curtailment : This constraint adapts (adjusts) the loss of generation
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that may occur from the outages of various components.
0 ≤ PdUNMi,hr ≤ Pdi,hr. (5.12)
In addition, the model also considers the limits on bus voltages, active and reactive
power generations, and transmission line capacities.
5.3 Composite Reliability Assessment and Critical Com-
ponents
Failure of a component can be due to various reasons such as system overload, ageing of
components, human error, weather, etc. Detecting the critical components of the system
can help planners make decisions on new investments, and operators to maintain a secure
supply during contingencies. Fig. 5.1 presents a detailed schematic of the proposed method
to determine the critical components of a composite power system. The procedure begins
with determining the system minimal cut sets (C̄h) at peak load (Fig. 5.1 (Part-I)), and
is based on [82] which can be summarized as follows: select a cut set of order M , and
execute the Smart-OPF, discussed in Section II-B, with all components of this cut set on
outage. If there is a loss of load at any bus (PdUNMi,hr 6= 0) then this cut set is a minimal
cut set of order M . Repeat this procedure for all possible M th order cut sets, and up
to the desired order of M . Thereafter, as shown in Fig. 5.1 (Part-II), the minimal cut
sets associated with a given component cm, (C̄h)cm, denoted as set {Xcm} are identified.
Considering a specific minimal cut set from {Xcm}, execute the Smart-OPF again, with
all components of the cut set on outage and hence calculate the probability of failure of
this minimal cut set, p(C̄h)cm, by multiplying the probability of failure of each cm that
construct this minimal cut set. Estimate LNSIC̄h,cm associated with this minimal cut set
and report the frequency of occurrence of the component fcm. Check for all minimal cut
sets associated with cm by repeating this procedure. Thereafter, the criticality index for
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CRcm is the EDNS for the component cm.
5.4 Case Studies and Assumptions
The main focus of this chapter is to evaluate the impact of PEV charging demand on
system adequacy, considering different shares of uncontrolled and smart charging PEVs
and different levels of DR. To this effect, several case studies are constructed adopting the
two uncontrolled charging strategies (a) A&P and (b) TOU price based.
The proposed framework is tested on the IEEE RTS, Fig. 3.5, [73]. The considered
PEVs are from eleven commonly found makes, based on their sales, and covers 95% of the
total number of PEVs sold in the US between 2010 to 2015 [83]. These PEVs are grouped
into four major classes, plug-in hybrid electric vehicle-I (PHEV), PHEV-II, battery elec-
tric vehicle-I (BEV) and BEV-II, with their parametric details provided in Table 5.1. The
NHTS 2009 data [38] has been considered to simulate driver behaviour. The charging
efficiency is assumed to be 90% [84–86], and two different charging levels are considered,
Level-1 (1.44 kW) and Level-2 (7.2 kW), with a share of 65% and 35%, respectively [87].
The number of houses at a bus is calculated assuming that 15% of the total load is res-
idential and the hourly load of a typical house is 2.08 kW [88]. It is assumed that 28%
of the houses have electric cars [89], the number of vehicles per house is 2, and that PEV
charging occurs only at home. For battery life consideration, it is assumed the battery
depth of charge is 70%.
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PEV Classes Considered For Studies
Market Battery AER Weighted Weighted
Share Capacity Average Average
Range Battery Size AER
(kWh) (km) (kWh) (km)
PHEV-I 26% 4.4-7.6 18-32 5.76 24.03
PHEV-II 24% 18.4 85 18.40 85
BEV-I 34% 14-24 100-135 21.89 124.03
BEV-II 16% 85 426 85.00 426
The daily mileage driven and home arrival time data of the vehicle classes selected, are
processed for developing in the pdfs in Fig. 5.2.













































































































Figure 5.2. Mileage driven and home arrival pdf of PEVs.
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5.5 Results And Discussions
5.5.1 Determining Reliability Indices in the Presence of PEVs
The 24 hour load profiles with 100% smart charging, and when the A&P based and TOU
price based uncontrolled charging strategies account for 100% of the PEV charging load,
are shown in Fig. 5.3. These are obtained from the Smart-OPF model, but without
considering any outages, to examine the impact of smart charging vis-à-vis uncontrolled
charging. It is noted that TOU price based uncontrolled charging results in more severe
peak loading as compared to A&P based, while smart charging is able to control the load
profile significantly, and the resulting profile is almost same as the base load profile.
The system minimal cut sets are identified using the method discussed in Section 5.2.2,
up to the second-order, in order to keep the computational burden within reasonable limits,
but without any loss of generality.
























































Figure 5.3. Load profiles for different charging shares, no DR.
Once the minimal cut sets are identified along with their outage probabilities, the cor-
responding reliability indices are determined, as discussed in Section 5.3. Fig.5.4 and Fig.
5.5 presents the hourly variation in LOLP and EDNS for different shares of uncontrolled
and smart charging, without DR. It is noted that the reliability indices are worse during
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hours 15-19, and significantly impacted by the share of uncontrolled charging. As this
share decreases, and replaced by smart charging, the reliability is improved.1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Total
LOLP
LOLE 0
EDNS 9.8E-05 9.4E-05 9.2E-05 9.2E-05 9.4E-05 0.00012 0.00014 3.62637 4.54438 4.54438 3.62637 3.62637 3.62637 1.80716 2.71437 9.21932 12.4606 12.4606 4.54438 0.44956 0.00013 0.00011 9.8E-05 0.0001 67.2514
EENS 0
LOLP 0.013 0.011 0.01 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.12208 0.12211 0.38837 0.37 0.27 0.1221 0.02 0.015 0.013
LOLE 0
EDNS 8.93E-05 8.43E-05 8.22E-05 8.15E-05 8.22E-05 0.0001 0.00013 0.00016 0.00016 0.00016 0.00016 0.00016 0.00016 0.00015 0.00015 0.00018 0.0002 13.2414 13.1366 0.00018 0.00014 0.00011 9.22E-05 9.60E-05 26.3809
EENS 0
LOLP 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 1.90E-06 3.80E-06 3.80E-06 3.80E-06 3.80E-06 3.80E-06 3.80E-06 2.50E-06 3.80E-06 0.01203 0.03303 0.33707 0.29489 0.02403 1.90E-06 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07
LOLE 0
EDNS 8.88E-05 8.40E-05 8.20E-05 8.13E-05 8.24E-05 0.0001 0.00012 0.00015 0.00016 0.00016 0.00015 0.00015 0.00015 0.00014 0.00015 0.33647 1.83538 13.93 10.3668 0.54809 0.00013 0.00011 9.16E-05 9.60E-05 27.019
EENS 0
LOLP 2.30E-06 7.00E-07 7.00E-07 2.30E-06 2.30E-06 2.30E-06 3.30E-06 2.30E-06 3.90E-06 3.90E-06 2.30E-06 2.30E-06 2.30E-06 3.90E-06 3.90E-06 0.01203 0.02403 0.29483 0.05003 0.012 3.30E-06 7.00E-07 2.30E-06 2.30E-06
LOLE 0
EDNS 0.00158 5.94E-05 5.84E-05 0.00151 0.00151 0.0016 0.00168 0.00011 0.00344 0.00177 0.00011 0.00011 0.00011 0.00174 0.00175 0.30561 1.62782 8.7962 3.49649 0.18612 0.00171 7.55E-05 0.00332 0.00157 14.4361
EENS 0
LOLP 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 1.10E-06 2.10E-06 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06007 0.09507 0.31144 0.11007 0.02804 2.10E-06 1.10E-06 9.00E-07 9.00E-07
LOLE 0
EDNS 8.79E-05 8.32E-05 8.13E-05 8.11E-05 8.17E-05 0.0001 0.00013 0.92416 1.19416 1.15316 0.85816 0.85016 0.84916 0.32915 0.63855 4.02766 8.62647 17.0768 11.8683 2.28304 0.00013 0.00011 8.99E-05 9.52E-05 50.68
EENS 0
LOLP 0.0065 0.0055 0.005 0.0045 0.004 0.0035 0.003 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.12208 0.12211 0.29145 0.21 0.05 0.0075 0.0065 0.0075 0.0065
LOLE 0
EDNS 0.9414 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.9 0.9 0.9 3.62637 4.54438 4.54438 3.62637 3.62637 3.62637 1.80716 2.71437 9.21932 12.4606 40.3301 37.1481 22 11 1.0394 1.48178 0.9414 170.138
EENS 0
LOLP 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 1.90E-06 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.12208 0.16411 0.20111 0.16411 0.034 1.90E-06 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07
LOLE 0
EDNS 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.09 0.09 0.00012 3.62637 4.54438 4.54438 3.62637 3.62637 3.62637 1.80716 2.71437 9.21932 12.4606 28.5104 20.3409 4.80475 1 0.6 0.5 0.4 107.132
EENS 0
LOLP 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 1.90E-06 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.03404 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.12208 0.16411 0.18911 0.12211 0.034 1.90E-06 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07
LOLE 0
EDNS 8.64E-05 8.20E-05 8.10E-05 8.00E-05 9.17E-05 0.0001 0.00012 3.80855 4.72416 4.64736 3.77757 3.66275 3.66135 1.86974 2.86195 10.5811 16.636 23.1605 12.4994 3.83875 0.00012 0.0001 8.97E-05 9.34E-05 95.7302
EENS 0
LOLP 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 2.30E-06 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.122 0.164 0.18 0.122 0.034 1.90E-06 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07
LOLE 0
EDNS 8.69E-05 8.86E-05 8.00E-05 7.98E-05 8.11E-05 0.0001 0.00113 3.76195 4.67796 4.62016 3.66815 3.65555 3.65555 1.85374 2.82655 10.2343 15.3997 20.1028 9.24757 2.87114 0.00012 0.0001 8.78E-05 9.62E-05 86.5771
EENS 0
LOLP 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 1.10E-06 2.10E-06 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.122 0.134 0.164 0.07 0.034 2.10E-06 1.10E-06 9.00E-07 9.00E-07
LOLE 0
EDNS 8.60E-05 8.19E-05 8.46E-05 7.95E-05 8.09E-05 0.0001 0.00012 3.71676 4.63336 4.59636 3.65556 3.64536 3.64536 1.83775 2.78815 9.89298 14.3161 17.2128 7.10437 1.91156 0.00013 0.0001 8.60E-05 9.33E-05 78.9575
EENS 0
LOLP 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 1.10E-06 2.10E-06 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.122 0.122 0.134 0.034 0.034 2.10E-06 1.10E-06 9.00E-07 9.00E-07
LOLE 0
EDNS 8.69E-05 8.08E-05 8.34E-05 8.39E-05 8.10E-05 9.99E-05 0.00013 3.67016 4.58956 4.56916 3.64096 3.63516 3.63516 1.82315 2.75215 9.55928 13.3688 14.5528 5.45957 0.95734 0.00012 9.94E-05 8.65E-05 9.23E-05 72.2143
EENS 0
LOLP 7.00E-07 7.00E-07 7.00E-07 7.00E-07 7.00E-07 7.00E-07 1.70E-06 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.034 0.014 1.70E-06 7.00E-07 7.00E-07 7.00E-07
LOLE 0
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Figure 5.4. Hourly LOLP for different charging shares, no DR.
Table 5.2 presents the reliability indices for no DR, and with varying shares of uncon-
trolled versus smart charging of PEVs. These results are obtained by neglecting ∆PDUP
and ∆PDDN in (5.4) and excluding the constraints (5.9) - (5.11) from the Smart-OPF
model. It is noted that the reliability is worse affected with 100% uncontrolled charg-
ing and improves as smart charging penetration i creases. Interestingly, the 100% smart
charging case is able to provide the same level of reliability as with the case of no PEV
loads.
The reliability indices for TOU price based uncontrolled charging are worse compared
to the A&P based charging, since all PEVs react on the price signal at the same time. It
can be seen from Table 5.2 that the LOLPsys is igher when considering TOU price based
uncontrolled charging. However, it may be noted that TOU price can be appropriately
adjusted by the utility to regulate the uncontrolled charging demand and hence can dampen
the adverse impact on the system.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Total
LOLP
LOLE 0
EDNS 9.8E-05 9.4E-05 9.2E-05 9.2E-05 9.4E-05 0.00012 0.00014 3.62637 4.54438 4.54438 3.62637 3.62637 3.62637 1.80716 2.71437 9.21932 12.4606 12.4606 4.54438 0.44956 0.00013 0.00011 9.8E-05 0.0001 67.2514
EENS 0
LOLP 0.013 0.011 0.01 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.12208 0.12211 0.38837 0.37 0.27 0.1221 0.02 0.015 0.013
LOLE 0
EDNS 8.93E-05 8.43E-05 8.22E-05 8.15E-05 8.22E-05 0.0001 0.00013 0.00016 0.00016 0.00016 0.00016 0.00016 0.00016 0.00015 0.00015 0.00018 0.0002 13.2414 13.1366 0.00018 0.00014 0.00011 9.22E-05 9.60E-05 26.3809
EENS 0
LOLP 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 1.90E-06 3.80E-06 3.80E-06 3.80E-06 3.80E-06 3.80E-06 3.80E-06 2.50E-06 3.80E-06 0.01203 0.03303 0.33707 0.29489 0.02403 1.90E-06 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07
LOLE 0
EDNS 8.88E-05 8.40E-05 8.20E-05 8.13E-05 8.24E-05 0.0001 0.00012 0.00015 0.00016 0.00016 0.00015 0.00015 0.00015 0.00014 0.00015 0.33647 1.83538 13.93 10.3668 0.54809 0.00013 0.00011 9.16E-05 9.60E-05 27.019
EENS 0
LOLP 2.30E-06 7.00E-07 7.00E-07 2.30E-06 2.30E-06 2.30E-06 3.30E-06 2.30E-06 3.90E-06 3.90E-06 2.30E-06 2.30E-06 2.30E-06 3.90E-06 3.90E-06 0.01203 0.02403 0.29483 0.05003 0.012 3.30E-06 7.00E-07 2.30E-06 2.30E-06
LOLE 0
EDNS 0.00158 5.94E-05 5.84E-05 0.00151 0.00151 0.0016 0.00168 0.00011 0.00344 0.00177 0.00011 0.00011 0.00011 0.00174 0.00175 0.30561 1.62782 8.7962 3.49649 0.18612 0.00171 7.55E-05 0.00332 0.00157 14.4361
EENS 0
LOLP 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 1.10E-06 2.10E-06 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06007 0.09507 0.31144 0.11007 0.02804 2.10E-06 1.10E-06 9.00E-07 9.00E-07
LOLE 0
EDNS 8.79E-05 8.32E-05 8.13E-05 8.11E-05 8.17E-05 0.0001 0.00013 0.92416 1.19416 1.15316 0.85816 0.85016 0.84916 0.32915 0.63855 4.02766 8.62647 17.0768 11.8683 2.28304 0.00013 0.00011 8.99E-05 9.52E-05 50.68
EENS 0
LOLP 0.0065 0.0055 0.005 0.0045 0.004 0.0035 0.003 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.12208 0.12211 0.29145 0.21 0.05 0.0075 0.0065 0.0075 0.0065
LOLE 0
EDNS 0.9414 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.9 0.9 0.9 3.62637 4.54438 4.54438 3.62637 3.62637 3.62637 1.80716 2.71437 9.21932 12.4606 40.3301 37.1481 22 11 1.0394 1.48178 0.9414 170.138
EENS 0
LOLP 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 1.90E-06 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.12208 0.16411 0.20111 0.16411 0.034 1.90E-06 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07
LOLE 0
EDNS 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.09 0.09 0.00012 3.62637 4.54438 4.54438 3.62637 3.62637 3.62637 1.80716 2.71437 9.21932 12.4606 28.5104 20.3409 4.80475 1 0.6 0.5 0.4 107.132
EENS 0
LOLP 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 1.90E-06 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.03404 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.12208 0.16411 0.18911 0.12211 0.034 1.90E-06 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07
LOLE 0
EDNS 8.64E-05 8.20E-05 8.10E-05 8.00E-05 9.17E-05 0.0001 0.00012 3.80855 4.72416 4.64736 3.77757 3.66275 3.66135 1.86974 2.86195 10.5811 16.636 23.1605 12.4994 3.83875 0.00012 0.0001 8.97E-05 9.34E-05 95.7302
EENS 0
LOLP 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 2.30E-06 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.122 0.164 0.18 0.122 0.034 1.90E-06 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07
LOLE 0
EDNS 8.69E-05 8.86E-05 8.00E-05 7.98E-05 8.11E-05 0.0001 0.00113 3.76195 4.67796 4.62016 3.66815 3.65555 3.65555 1.85374 2.82655 10.2343 15.3997 20.1028 9.24757 2.87114 0.00012 0.0001 8.78E-05 9.62E-05 86.5771
EENS 0
LOLP 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 1.10E-06 2.10E-06 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.122 0.134 0.164 0.07 0.034 2.10E-06 1.10E-06 9.00E-07 9.00E-07
LOLE 0
EDNS 8.60E-05 8.19E-05 8.46E-05 7.95E-05 8.09E-05 0.0001 0.00012 3.71676 4.63336 4.59636 3.65556 3.64536 3.64536 1.83775 2.78815 9.89298 14.3161 17.2128 7.10437 1.91156 0.00013 0.0001 8.60E-05 9.33E-05 78.9575
EENS 0
LOLP 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 9.00E-07 1.10E-06 2.10E-06 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.122 0.122 0.134 0.034 0.034 2.10E-06 1.10E-06 9.00E-07 9.00E-07
LOLE 0
EDNS 8.69E-05 8.08E-05 8.34E-05 8.39E-05 8.10E-05 9.99E-05 0.00013 3.67016 4.58956 4.56916 3.64096 3.63516 3.63516 1.82315 2.75215 9.55928 13.3688 14.5528 5.45957 0.95734 0.00012 9.94E-05 8.65E-05 9.23E-05 72.2143
EENS 0
LOLP 7.00E-07 7.00E-07 7.00E-07 7.00E-07 7.00E-07 7.00E-07 1.70E-06 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.034 0.014 1.70E-06 7.00E-07 7.00E-07 7.00E-07
LOLE 0
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Figure 5.5. Hourly EDNS for different charging shares, no DR.
Table 5.2:
System Reliability Indices without DR
A&P Based Charging TOU Price Based Charging
PEV Penetration (%) LOLPSys LOLE EENS LOLPSys LOLE EENS
Uncontrolled Smart at Peak (hr/day) (p.u/day) at Peak (hr/day) (p.u./day)
No PEV 0.1221 0.6864 0.6725 0.12211 0.6864 0.6725
100% 0% 0.3531 1.5536 1.6773 0.38837 1.6948 1.7596
90% 10% 0.3531 1.4262 1.6091 0.37078 1.5985 1.6779
80% 20% 0.3371 1.3656 1.5375 0.35675 1.3833 1.6111
70% 30% 0.2948 1.2995 1.4474 0.31144 1.3421 1.4951
60% 40% 0.2791 1.26 1.3811 0.30511 1.3102 1.4285
50% 50% 0.2571 1.0585 1.2134 0.26145 123.52 1.3302
40% 60% 0.2011 0.9365 1.0811 0.19857 0.9939 1.1009
30% 70% 0.1801 0.8675 0.9624 0.18912 0.8944 0.9958
20% 80% 0.1641 0.8264 0.8520 0.17232 0.8522 0.9082
10% 90% 0.1491 0.7254 0.7542 0.15422 0.7902 0.7945
0% 100% 0.1221 0.6864 0.6725 0.1221 0.6864 0.6725
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5.5.2 Impact of PEV Charging and DR on Reliability
In this section, the DR option is introduced by including ∆PDUP and ∆PDDN in (5.4)
and the constraints (5.9) - (5.11) in the Smart-OPF model. The purpose is to investigate
the role of DR in assisting the system reliability. To this effect, two different values of BUP
and BDN of 5% and 10% are considered.
The impact of DR on the charging of PEVs is shown in Fig. 5.6(a) and Fig. 5.6(b)
without considering any outage. It is noted that if there is no DR, the desired adequacy
level in the presence of PEVs, of LOLPSys = 0.1221, is only attained with 100% smart
charging which is quite impractical to achieve in the near-term. Therefore, to maintain the
desired adequacy level, DR is a viable option, and the impact of the demand participating
in DR programs, i.e. the values of BUP and BDN , on system reliability need be investigated.
Comparing the plots in Fig. 5.6(a) and Fig. 5.6(b) with those in Fig. 5.3, it is noted
that DR significantly dampens the peak load, to the order of about 200 MW, in the case
of 100% A&P based PEV charging.
The same exercise in determining the minimal cut sets and the reliability indices is
repeated considering DR. From Table 5.2 and 5.3, it is noted that for the cases with no
PEV, LOLPSys improved from 0.1221 (without DR) to 0.034 with 5% DR and to 0.014
with 10% DR.
When PEVs are considered and DR = 5%, it is noted from Table 5.3 that the value of
LOLPSys is high (=0.18) with 100% uncontrolled charging. As the smart charging share
increases, LOLPSys decreases, and with 30% smart charging, the designed adequacy level
is achieved. It is noted that DR can significantly improve the reliability indices; when DR
increases to 10% for both A&P based charging and TOU price based charging, the value
of LOLPSys is below the designed LOLP of 0.1221, even with 100% uncontrolled charging.
Fig. 5.7 and Fig. 5.8 presents the hourly variation of LOLPSys and EDNS for various
shares of PEV smart charging, with 5% and 10% DR, respectively. It is noted from the
figures that the DR has a significant impact on both the indices and can play a significant























































































































































































































































































































(b) DR = 10%
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(b) DR = 10%
Figure 5.8. Hourly EDNS for different charging shares, with DR.
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Table 5.3:
System Reliability Indices with DR
A&P TOU Price
Based Charging Based Charging
5% DR 10% DR 10% DR
PEV
LOLPSys LOLE EENS LOLPSys LOLE EENS LOLPSys LOLE EENS
Penetration (%)
Uncontrolled Smart
at Peak (hr/day) (p.u./day) at Peak (hr/day) (p.u./day) at Peak (hr/day) (p.u./day)
No PEV 0.034 0.4221 0.2247 0.014 0.182 0.0345 0.014 0.182 0.0345
100% 0% 0.18 0.842 0.8549 0.034 0.442 0.372 0.034 0.476 0.386
90% 10% 0.164 0.723 0.7486 0.034 0.442 0.327 0.034 0.456 0.337
80% 20% 0.134 0.666 0.6582 0.034 0.442 0.281 0.034 0.456 0.289
70% 30% 0.122 0.654 0.5783 0.034 0.442 0.272 0.034 0.442 0.272
60% 40% 0.122 0.586 0.5037 0.034 0.442 0.191 0.034 0.442 0.191
50% 50% 0.07 0.514 0.4441 0.034 0.292 0.146 0.034 0.292 0.146
40% 60% 0.07 0.514 0.3904 0.034 0.222 0.117 0.034 0.222 0.117
30% 70% 0.034 0.442 0.3430 0.034 0.222 0.0918 0.014 0.222 0.0918
20% 80% 0.034 0.442 0.3036 0.014 0.182 0.0717 0.014 0.182 0.0717
10% 90% 0.034 0.442 0.2641 0.014 0.182 0.0531 0.014 0.182 0.0531
0% 100% 0.034 0.442 0.2317 0.014 0.182 0.0345 0.014 0.182 0.0345
Fig. 5.9 presents a comparison of LOLPSys for various shares of PEV smart charging
penetration, vis-à-vis, the contribution of DR participation. It is noted that without DR,
the system reliability exceeds the level specified by the planner, with penetration of PEV
charging loads, unless 100% smart charging is used. With DR = 5%, and A&P based
uncontrolled charging, the share of smart charging need be at least 30% to ensure system
LOLP below the desired level. With DR = 10%, LOLPSys is always below the desired
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Figure 5.9. Comparison of system LOLP.
5.5.3 Effect of PEV on Components Criticality
All the minimal cut sets are identified for the peak hour (hour-18) with their corresponding
p(C̄h) and LNSIC̄h and grouped with associated component cm; 32 groups for generators
and 38 groups for lines.
For each of these minimal cut sets associated with a cm, p(C̄h)cm and LNSIC̄h,cm are
determined, and the criticality index for a cm, CRcm, is calculated, as given in (5.13).
The criticality index is determined for each component under study, for the base case,
where there is no PEV charging load or DR; various shares of A&P based PEV charging
and smart charging; and various shares of A&P based PEV charging with smart charging
and DR option. The list of system components ranked by criticality index is presented in
Table 5.4. Components with very low values of CRcm are not mentioned in the ranking
list. Generators G22 and G23 are found to be the most critical components in the system
because of their reliability characteristics, capacities and locations.
In the Base Case, without PEVs or DR, there are 10 components listed with the criti-
cality index in decreasing order; these are noted to be all generators. In the case of A&P
95
uncontrolled charging with smart charging, Line-11 also appears in the list of critical com-
ponents for 100% or 50% uncontrolled charging; while the list with 100% smart charging
is exactly same as the Base Case.
When DR is introduced in the presence of A&P uncontrolled and smart charging,
the list of critical components is significantly curtailed, only a few components are now
critical, their CRcm values are much reduced, for all combinations of uncontrolled and
smart charging as seen in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4:
Ranking of Components by their Criticality
Base Case A&P Based Charging + Smart Charging A&P Based Charging + Smart Charging + DR
(No PEV, No DR) 0% + 100% 50% + 50% 100% + 0% 0% + 100% + 10% 50% + 50% + 10% 100% + 0% + 10%
Rank cm fcm CRcm cm fcm CRcm cm fcm CRcm cm fcm CRcm cm fcm CRcm cm fcm CRcm cm fcm CRcm
1 G22 10 0.08004 G22 10 0.08004 G22 27 0.15792 G22 1 0.301 G22 1 0.00331 G22 2 0.02014 G22 3 0.04077
2 G23 10 0.07931 G23 10 0.07931 G23 23 0.15658 G23 1 0.2987 G23 1 0.00331 G23 2 0.02 G23 3 0.04059
3 G32 6 0.04552 G32 6 0.04552 G32 17 0.09011 G32 1 0.1446 G32 2 0.00823 G32 3 0.02614
4 G12 3 0.00993 G12 3 0.00993 G12 3 0.02547 G12 7 0.16421 L11 1 0.00011 L11 4 0.00017
5 G13 3 0.00993 G13 3 0.00993 G13 3 0.02547 G13 7 0.16421
6 G14 3 0.00993 G14 3 0.00993 G14 3 0.02547 G14 7 0.16421
7 G20 2 0.00324 G20 2 0.00324 G20 3 0.01514 G21 4 0.05164
8 G21 2 0.00321 G21 2 0.00321 G21 3 0.01512 G20 4 0.05137
9 G30 2 0.00286 G30 2 0.00286 G30 3 0.01482 G30 4 0.05001
10 G31 2 0.00286 G31 2 0.00286 G31 3 0.01482 G31 4 0.05001
11 L11 4 0.00015 L11 8 0.00078
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5.6 Summary
This chapter has presented a reliability analysis framework for a composite power system
considering PEV customer charging behavior in order to study the impact of PEVs on the
grid. A Smart-OPF model was peoposed to compute the system minimal cut sets for a
24-hour load demand, and subsequently the daily system reliability indices were obtained.
Different vehicle types, charging levels, penetration levels, and charging scenarios were
examined. Results showed that PEVs charged in uncontrolled mode would negatively
impact system reliability, while smart charging can significantly alleviate their impact. In
addition, it was found that TOU electricity pricing had a severe impact on system reliability
as compared to A&P based uncontrolled charging. Therefore, TOU price periods need be
adjusted to mitigate the impact of PEV charging loads. A novel procedure to determine
the critical components in composite power systems in the presence of PEV charging loads
and DR was proposed. The method provided a ranking of components by their criticality,






Reliability evaluation plays an important role in system analysis, design, upgrades, and
operations, especially in composite power systems. This research presents a comprehen-
sive framework for composite power systems to assess the reliability from uncertain events.
The concept of minimal cut sets is applied to evaluate two sets of indices, at the system
level and nodal level. System-wide indices can be utilized by both planners and operators
to determine the likelihood of interruption of supply, while nodal indices provide useful
information on the most important nodes during system disturbances. The challenge of
using analytical methods in reliability evaluation of composite power systems is the large
computational burden involved, to examine all the possible outage events. Once the com-
ponent failure probability is calculated using the data of the failure and repair rates, the
minimal cut set evaluation is implemented.
In Chapter 2, a brief background on some basic definitions, reliability measures and
adequacy indices, and basic approaches to reliability evaluation of the power system, was
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described. Thereafter, the description and applications of ERs, DR, and PEVs were pre-
sented, followed by a brief introduction to clustering techniques.
Chapter 3 presented novel clustering techniques based approaches to determine the
optimal location, size and year of installation of ERs in composite power system. The
K-means clustering and Fuzzy C-means clustering techniques were applied to the set of
reliability indices, LNSIs, which were determined using nodal minimal cut sets. Once the
optimal sizes and locations of ERs were obtained, the earliest year of penetration was
determined using an adequacy check algorithm. Studies were carried out considering the
24-bus IEEE RTS.
In Chapter 4, a novel method to detect the critical components in a composite power
system was presented, and the method was illustrated by application to the 6-bus RBTS
and to the 24-bus IEEE RTS. Studies were carried out evaluating system reliability under
steady state conditions, and assessing the operational risks in real-time system operations.
The objective was to identify the critical components in order to help planners to make
economic decisions on new investments in generation capacities and transmission lines
upgrades, also to help operators maintain the delivery of electricity during system failure
and disturbance events.
In Chapter 5, a novel framework to evaluate the impact of PEV charging loads on
composite power system reliability was presented. A Smart-OPF model combined with
a minimum cut set approach was proposed to evaluate the system reliability indices, ex-
amining various combinations of shares of uncontrolled and smart charging PEVs. DR
was included in the proposed procedure and its impact on system reliability indices was
studied. Finally, the procedure to determine the critical components of the power system
in the presence of PEV loads and DR was proposed. Detailed studies considering the IEEE
RTS, demonstrating the applicability of the proposed technique, were presented.
The main conclusions of the presented work are:
 The findings of nodal minimal cut sets provide a better understanding of the relia-
bility of serving load at a specific bus, while system minimal cut sets provide useful
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information for both planners and operators to determine the likelihood of interrup-
tion of supply.
 System/bus reliability does not change significantly with higher order minimal cut set
beyond third order; however, the computational burden can be very high. Therefore,
third order minimal cut sets are sufficient for this purpose of these studies.
 The choice of either the K-Means or Fuzzy C-Means clustering technique has little
impact on the selection of ERs, and their optimal size, site and year of installation
are very close to each other.
 The impact of the presence of ERs is observed in the formation of new combinations
of minimal cut sets. Some of these new cut sets were previously of lower order, and
have changed to a higher order cut set, and no longer leads to an interruption. These
changes improve the system reliability, since, when the cut set order increases, its
unavailability reduces.
 The selection of critical components depends on the nature of the problem, i.g.,
whether it is a planning problem or an operational issue; the likelihood of failure
can be different at the steady-state condition and in the operational stage, and can
change the criticality of a component.
 It is viable to have DR as a practical option to dampen the adverse impact of the
PEV charging loads on system reliability. Whereas for 10% DR, the system reliability
is always below the desired level set by system planners, for any mix of uncontrolled
and smart charging loads. With 5% DR, the share of smart charging need be at least
30% to ensure system reliability is below the desired level.
6.2 Research Contributions
The main contributions of the research presented in this thesis can be summarized as
follows:
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 A novel OPF based procedure was proposed to compute the nodal minimal cut sets
for composite power systems, since these identify the subset of cut sets that were
associated with the loss of load at a specific bus. Using the nodal minimal cut sets,
the nodal LNSI indices were hence determined. This information is very useful to
system planners and operators as it provides an insight into the reliability of serving
the load at a specific location.
 For the first time, the K-means and the Fuzzy C-means clustering techniques were
applied to identify critical reliability clusters in composite power systems. Hence,
the sizing and siting of ERs that should be in place in the composite system, in
the terminal year were determined. Furthermore, the impact of the choice of an
appropriate clustering technique has been discussed. Two different OPF objectives
were considered to examine how the solution of minimal cut sets and hence the
optimal ER plan was impacted.
 A novel adequacy check algorithm was proposed, that was applied sequentially over
the plan period, starting from the first year to determine the earliest year of pen-
etration of ERs, to satisfy the system adequacy constraints and achieving a target
reliability level over a long-term plan.
 A quantitative method, using system minimal cut sets that introduced a priority list
of critical components in the power system, was developed. The critical components
were ranked in order of the impact caused by their outage, to system reliability, for
different combinations of outage scenarios under steady-state conditions and short-
term operations. From these studies, useful information could be provided to the
transmission system operator and system planner, for decision-making pertaining to
operational planning, strategic maintenance planning and investment planning.
 A novel Smart-OPF model was developed to determine the minimal cut sets consider-
ing the uncontrolled and smart charging PEV loads. The uncontrolled PEV charging
load profile at each system bus was obtained using a data analysis technique with
real mobility data. Using these minimal cut sets, the composite system reliability in-
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dices of the power system, in the presence of PEV loads, were determined for various
degrees of smart charging penetration.
 The impact of DR on composite system adequacy by damping the peak load in
the presence of PEV loads was considered for the first time by including it in the
Smart-OPF.
 Determining the critical components in composite power systems in the presence of
PEV charging loads and DR was proposed, providing a ranking list of components
by their criticality, that would pertaining to system operations and planning.
6.3 Future Work
Based on the work presented in this thesis, future research may explore the following issues:
 The decision of new addition of ERs with regard to the choice of ER technology and
their associated costs can be taken into account. The optimal sizing and siting of
ERs based on nodal reliability can be extended to include the cost of investments.
The model can also include the expected cost of interruption of customers over the
planning horizon.
 A value based reliability planning model can be developed that takes into account the
expected cost of interruption of various system components based on their criticality
indices and cost of component upgrades, and hence integrate these information in a
system planning environment to determine the most beneficial component upgrade
and timing of installation. The objective of the value-based reliability planning model
will be to create a balance between the cost of improving system reliability with the
cost of system upgrades. Various other factors such as operation cost, loss cost,
capital investment cost, components aging, outage duration, seasonal outage rates
and types of customers can also be considered.
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 The proposed reliability framework can be extended to incorporate reliability models
for intermittent generators, in particular renewable-based ERs. In the present work
only dispatchable ER units were considered to examine and assess the reliability of
the power system following uncertain events. The power output from renewable ER
is typically intermittent and uncertain and is highly dependent on external charac-
teristics such as wind speed, solar radiation, etc., at a particular site. In order to
consider such ER units in reliability problem, it will be necessary to consider un-
certainties in the proposed framework. This can be done by improving the present
framework to include dependent outages, such as fluctuating weather and derated
generator unit outages, in reliability calculations.
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Table A1:




1 1 20 10 0
2 1 20 10 0
3 1 76 30 25
4 1 76 30 25
5 2 20 10 0
6 2 20 10 0
7 2 76 30 25
8 2 76 30 25
9 7 100 60 0
10 7 100 60 0
11 7 100 60 0
12 13 197 80 0
13 13 197 80 0
14 13 197 80 0
15 15 12 6 0
16 15 12 6 0
17 15 12 6 0
18 15 12 6 0
19 15 12 6 0
20 15 155 80 50
21 16 155 80 50
22 18 400 200 50
23 21 400 200 50
24 22 50 16 10
25 22 50 16 10
26 22 50 16 10
27 22 50 16 10
28 22 50 16 10
29 22 50 16 10
30 23 155 80 50
31 23 155 80 50
32 23 350 150 25
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Table A2:
Voltage Correction Devices [73]




Reactor 6 100 Reactive
Table A3:






12 Oil/Steam 2940 60 0.02
20 Oil/CT 450 50 0.1
50 Hydro 1980 20 0.01
76 Coal/Steam 1960 40 0.02
100 Oil/Steam 1200 50 0.04
155 Coal/Steam 960 40 0.04
197 Oil/Steam 950 50 0.05
350 Coal/Steam 1150 100 0.08
400 Nuclear 1100 150 0.12
** MTTF = mean time to failure = λ−1
MTTR = mean time to repair = µ−1
Forced Outage Rate = MTTR / (MTTF + MTTR)
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Table A4:
























Hourly Peak Load in Percent of Daily Peak [73]
Winter Weeks Summer Weeks Spring/Fall Weeks
1-8 & 44-52 18-30 9-17 & 31-43
Hour Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend
12-1am 67 78 64 74 63 75
1-2 63 72 60 70 62 73
2-3 60 68 58 66 60 69
3-4 59 66 56 65 58 66
4-5 59 64 56 64 59 65
5-6 60 65 58 62 65 65
6-7 74 66 64 62 72 68
7-8 86 70 76 66 85 74
8-9 95 80 87 81 95 83
9-10 96 88 95 86 99 89
10-11 96 90 99 91 100 92
11-Noon 95 91 100 93 99 94
Noon-1pm 95 90 99 93 93 91
1-2 95 88 100 92 92 90
2-3 93 87 100 91 90 90
3-4 94 87 97 91 88 86
4-5 99 91 96 92 90 85
5-6 100 100 96 94 92 88
6-7 100 99 93 95 96 92
7-8 96 97 92 95 98 100
8-9 91 94 92 100 96 97
9-10 83 92 93 93 90 95
10-11 73 87 87 88 80 90
11-12 63 81 72 80 70 85
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Table A6:
Transmission Line Length, Reliability, Impedance, and Rating Data [73]
Line From To Length λ MTTR Impedance Normal
Number Bus Bus P.U. /100 MVA Base Rating
(mile) (1/yr) (hours) R X B (MVA)
1 1 2 3 0.24 16 0.003 0.014 0.461 175
2 1 3 55 0.51 10 0.055 0.211 0.057 175
3 1 5 22 0.33 10 0.022 0.085 0.023 175
4 2 4 33 0.39 10 0.033 0.127 0.034 175
5 2 6 50 0.48 10 0.05 0.192 0.052 175
6 3 9 31 0.38 10 0.031 0.119 0.032 175
7 3 24 0 0.02 768 0.002 0.084 0 400
8 4 9 27 0.36 10 0.027 0.104 0.028 175
9 5 10 23 0.34 10 0.023 0.088 0.024 175
10 6 10 16 0.33 35 0.014 0.061 2.459 175
11 7 8 16 0.3 10 0.016 0.061 0.017 175
12 8 9 43 0.44 10 0.042 0.161 0.044 175
13 8 10 43 0.44 10 0.043 0.165 0.045 175
14 9 11 0 0.02 768 0.043 0.165 0.045 175
15 9 12 0 0.02 768 0.002 0.084 0 400
16 10 11 0 0.02 768 0.002 0.084 0 400
17 10 12 0 0.02 768 0.002 0.084 0 400
18 11 13 33 0.4 11 0.006 0.048 0.1 500
19 11 14 29 0.39 11 0.005 0.042 0.088 500
20 12 13 33 0.4 11 0.006 0.048 0.1 500
21 12 23 67 0.52 11 0.012 0.097 0.203 500
22 13 23 60 0.49 11 0.011 0.087 0.182 500
23 14 16 27 0.38 11 0.005 0.059 0.082 500
24 15 16 12 0.33 11 0.002 0.017 0.036 500
25 15 21 34 0.41 11 0.006 0.049 0.103 500
26 15 21 34 0.41 11 0.006 0.049 0.103 500
27 15 24 36 0.41 11 0.007 0.052 0.109 500
28 16 17 18 0.35 11 0.003 0.026 0.055 500
29 16 19 16 0.34 11 0.003 0.023 0.049 500
30 17 18 10 0.32 11 0.002 0.014 0.03 500
31 17 22 73 0.54 11 0.014 0.105 0.221 500
32 18 21 18 0.35 11 0.003 0.026 0.055 500
33 18 21 18 0.35 11 0.003 0.026 0.055 500
34 19 20 27.5 0.38 11 0.005 0.04 0.083 500
35 19 20 27.5 0.38 11 0.005 0.04 0.083 500
36 20 23 15 0.34 11 0.003 0.022 0.046 500
37 20 23 15 0.34 11 0.003 0.022 0.046 500
38 21 22 47 0.45 11 0.009 0.068 0.142 500
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Appendix B
Roy Billinton Test System Data
Table B1:





1 1 40 17 -15 Thermal
2 1 40 17 -15 Thermal
3 1 10 7 0 Thermal
4 1 20 12 -7 Thermal
5 2 5 5 0 Hydro
6 2 5 5 0 Hydro
7 2 40 17 -15 Hydro
8 2 20 12 -7 Hydro
9 2 20 12 -7 Hydro
10 2 20 12 -7 Hydro
11 2 20 12 -7 Hydro
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Table B2:
Generating Unit Reliability Data [80]
Unit Size




5 Hydro 2 4380 45 0.01
10 Theraml 1 2190 45 0.02
20 Hydro 4 3650 55 0.015
20 Theraml 1 1752 45 0.025
40 Hydro 1 2920 60 0.02
40 Theraml 2 1460 45 0.03
Table B3:











**Unity power factor is assumed. At 0.98
power factor, the reactive load Mvar re-




Transmission Line Length, Reliability, Impedance, and Rating Data [80]
Line From To Length λ MTTR Impedance Current
Number Bus Bus P.U. /100 MVA Base Rating
(KM) (per year) (hours) R X B/2 (p.u.)
1 1 3 75 1.5 10 0.0342 0.18 0.0106 0.85
2 2 4 250 5 10 0.114 0.6 0.0352 0.71
3 1 2 200 4 10 0.0912 0.48 0.0282 0.71
4 3 4 50 1 10 0.0228 0.12 0.0071 0.71
5 3 5 50 1 10 0.0228 0.12 0.0071 0.71
6 1 3 75 1.5 10 0.0342 0.18 0.0106 0.85
7 2 4 250 5 10 0.114 0.6 0.0352 0.71
8 4 5 50 1 10 0.0228 0.12 0.0071 0.71
9 5 6 50 1 10 0.0228 0.12 0.0071 0.71
**100 MVA base
230 kV base
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